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ABSTRACT
3 ESSAYS ON MARKETS, HIERARCHIES, AND MORALITY
Jooho Lee
Thomas Donaldson

In my dissertation, I examine issues related to markets and hierarchies, which are core
conceptual building blocks for economic theories of the firm, from a moral point of view.
The first essay engages with economic theories of the firm and argues that there is a
tension between the two primary metaphors – contracts and hierarchies – utilized by
economists to describe the nature and purpose of the firm.
The second essay provides a moral reason for drawing the distinction between markets
and firms in the first place. It argues that the principle of fair play justifies the adoption
of a proposed three-part test for employee classification based on economic theories of
entrepreneurship.
The third essay applies the insights from the first two chapters by arguing that
stakeholder theory should pay greater attention to the contract metaphor within theories
of the firm.
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ESSAY 1:
Contracts and Hierarchies: A Moral Examination of Economic Theories of the Firm

I. INTRODUCTION
What is the nature of the firm, and what is its purpose? Economic theories of the
firm try to answer the questions of why firms exist and what are their boundaries
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1989). However, they are not mere academic inquiries. They also
have important implications for corporate governance and managerial practice because
they can shape how we view relationships inside the firm and act in light of them. For
instance, the economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts designed to overcome
various forms of agency costs (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling
1976) has had enormous influence on how we structure corporate governance
relationships in both law and practice. Despite their widespread influence, however,
many business ethicists have argued that economic theories of the firm fall short of our
normative ideals for a variety of reasons. Some have argued that economic theories
ignore morally salient features within the firm and thus contribute to unequal relations
between employers and employees (Néron 2015). Others are even more skeptical of the
very use of economic language to describe the firm. For some, the usage of economic
language to describe the firm de-values and de-humanizes stakeholder relationships
because it reduces morality within the firm to an “economic morality,” which is solely
“the morality of money and power” (Hendry 2001: 225).
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The aim of this article is to examine the moral values implicit within economic
theories of the firm by focusing on two primary metaphors used by economists –
contracts and hierarchies. Its main claim is that the contract and hierarchy metaphors are
either morally incompatible or logically inconsistent with each other, at least in the way
that economic theories of the firm use them. The hierarchy metaphor has been utilized
since the earliest economic theories of the firm, and it forms the basis for one large
tradition of economic theories that have been very influential. Within this view, the
primary purpose of the firm is to minimize the costs associated with market transactions,
and the nature of the firm is a hierarchy that can reduce such costs under certain
circumstances (e.g., Coase 1937; Williamson 1975). The contract metaphor has also had
a long history, and it presents a significant challenge to the hierarchical view. The
contractarian view of the firm argues that the primary purpose of the firm is to facilitate
the aims of firm participants and that the nature of the firm is a nexus of contractual
relationships between them that are intended to achieve these aims (e.g., Alchian and
Demsetz 1972; Easterbrook and Fischel 1991). This paper will examine the metaphors of
contract and hierarchy from a moral point of view by appealing to the Kantian
requirement to treat the humanity in ourselves and others as an end and not as a mere
means (Kant 1785). Treating the employee as an end and not as a mere means, it will
argue, requires respect for the employee’s will in a way that is consistent with the
contract metaphor but at odds with the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy.
To be clear, this paper is a normative and theoretical critique of the economic
theory of the firm as a hierarchy. First, it is a normative critique because it questions not
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whether hierarchy is the dominant mode of firm organization in the real world but,
instead, whether the idea of a hierarchy should be the dominant mode of explaining the
nature and purpose of the firm. Second, it is a theoretical critique because it does not
give a final answer to the question of whether hierarchies should be the dominant mode
of firm organization in the real world. Instead, the paper is an attempt to change how
academics and practitioners view the nature and purpose of the firm at a theoretical level.
Even if authority relations do and should continue to pervade how we organize into firms,
the claim is that we should not view the firm as a hierarchy that exists to minimize
transaction costs because it would result in our viewing and treating the firm’s employees
as a mere means. Third, a normative and theoretical critique is different from a mere
semantic dispute or an argument for arguments’ sake. Whether or not we call various
power relationships within the firm as hierarchies is beside the point. What matters is
how we view their purpose. The economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy views the
purpose of the firm as the minimization of transaction costs. And if our view of the
power relationships within the firm rests on a mechanism for cost minimization that is at
odds with respect for persons, we ought not accept such an account nor allow it to
influence how we structure our economic lives. And changing our views of the purpose
of the firm will have significant real-world consequences, including implications for law,
corporate governance, and managerial practice. Rather than an argument for arguments’
sake, the proposed shift in how we view the nature and purpose of the firm will motivate
changes at these levels in addition to academic discourse.
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Lastly, this paper is not an attempt to defend economic theories of the firm that
have come to represent the contractarian view nor an attempt to present a comprehensive
and/or a morally acceptable theory of the firm. Instead, its aims are more modest. By
focusing on the moral requirements of Kantian respect within the contracts that constitute
the firm, it attempts to point out a problem with understanding the firm as a costminimizing hierarchy if we truly take seriously the idea of voluntary contracting.
Implicit within the very idea of voluntary contracting lies a moral requirement to respect
the humanity of all parties involved. A firm constituted by voluntary contracts, then,
requires far more from firm participants than narrow-minded self-interest that economic
theories of the firm assume. Although a full moral explication of the theory of the firm
built on the foundation of the contract metaphor will require greater normative
examination of some other core building blocks – agency, property, etc. – the idea of
truly voluntary contracts within the firm rules out certain hierarchical conceptions of the
firm and paves the way toward a truly morally acceptable theory of the firm, to be
developed in the future.
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section provides a historical overview
of economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy. Beginning with Ronald Coase’s critique
of Frank Knight’s theory of the firm and ending with Oliver Williamson’s account of the
firm as a hierarchy into which firm participants contract, this section presents the ways
the metaphors of contract and hierarchy are typically evoked within economic theories of
the firm. The second section begins the moral examination of economic theories of the
firm by focusing on the contract metaphor. After highlighting the importance of
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voluntariness to economic accounts of contracting, it draws on Kant’s moral philosophy
to argue that the idea of voluntariness generates an obligation to treat persons as ends and
not as a mere means. A voluntary contract must respect persons in such a manner and
thus refrain from contradicting or ignoring the wills of everyone involved. The third
section turns to the hierarchy metaphor and argues that its usage within economic
theories of the firm is incompatible with the idea of voluntary contracting. One cannot
contract into a hierarchy because doing so would either treat the humanity of the
employee as a mere means or undermine the very purpose of the hierarchy. The fourth
section discusses the implications for the incompatibility of contracts with hierarchies.
After contrasting hierarchical relationships with agency relationships, it examines the role
that authority relationships play in theories of the firm and looks to the metaphor of
contract to serve as a foundation for a more promising theory of the firm.
II. CONTRACTS AND HIERARCHIES
This section provides an overview of the metaphors of contract and hierarchy
within economic theories of the firm and distinguishes two types of theories that
emphasize one metaphor over the other. Economic theories of the firm typically begin
with the baseline assumption that markets serve an important and valuable coordinating
mechanism for production in society. Among other things, markets promote economic
efficiency associated with resource allocation and production. Whereas firms centralize
production under a manager-entrepreneur who directs the effort of his employees,
markets utilize the price mechanism to coordinate production in a decentralized manner
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(Coase 1937). This decentralized coordination grants the market an important advantage
for resource allocation. Because each individual has localized knowledge about his or
her circumstances, relying on individuals to make allocative decisions within their
particular contexts leads to greater aggregate social welfare than a centralized mechanism
for coordination (Hayek 1945). Moreover, markets also promote the efficiency of
production by supporting the division of labor. The division of labor into specialized
functions drastically increases productivity – and thus wealth and welfare – in society
(Smith 1776). Without a robust market, however, economic actors would not be able to
specialize in producing a particular good because they would also need to focus on
producing the wide variety of goods needed for their survival. By providing avenues to
trade for the diversity of goods that we need to survive, markets allow us to focus on
increasing the productivity of our labor through specialization.
Given the advantages of allocating resources through markets, the question goes,
why should firms exist at all? Why do firms persist in floating separately in a sea of
market contracting like “butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk” (Coase 1937: 388)?
An important precursor to theories of the firm focused largely on the effect that
uncertainty in the market has on the division of labor (Knight 1921). The future is
riddled with both risk and uncertainty. Risk refers to the ways in which future outcomes
are indeterminate in probabilistic – and thus calculable – ways. Uncertainty, on the other
hand, refers to the indeterminacies in the future that cannot even be calculated. Under
uncertainty, the importance of execution fades into the background, and “the primary
problem or function [becomes] deciding what to do and how to do it” (Knight 1921: 268).
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Because a multitude of factors on both the demand and supply side rest largely on an
uncertain future, Knight argues that economic life is fraught with uncertainty. Under this
theory, markets and firms both exist as successful adaptations to deal with uncertainty.
The production of goods and services to a market is a useful method of dealing with the
uncertainty of demand because it consolidates a large segment of potential customers
who do not always know what they want in the future. Within such an arrangement,
however, judgment about anticipating future demand under conditions of uncertainty
become extremely important. And because there are some people who possess superior
economic judgment than others, the increased importance of economic judgment confers
an advantage to the centralization of production under the authority of a specialized class
of manager-entrepreneurs (Langlois and Cosgel 1993). What results, then, is the rise of
firms controlled by manager-entrepreneurs who believe that they can anticipate the
aggregation of future demand within a market better than others.
The first major theory of the firm is a response to Knight’s argument. Ronald
Coase argues in his seminal essay that Knight’s argument about the firm does not explain
why firms exist at all (1937). If the firm exists simply because a certain class of
manager-entrepreneurs who believe that they are better at others at anticipating the
future, there is no reason to think that a contractual arrangement could not produce the
same results. Rather than consolidating in a firm, the confident entrepreneur could
simply enter into contracts with suppliers of goods and labor to profit from their abilities.
A theory of the firm must explain why a firm exists in the first place and, if there are
good reasons why it exists, why there isn’t one giant firm. In other words, it must
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provide an account of the reason for the firm’s existence and its boundaries. Coase’s
famous argument addresses both of these points. He argues that the firm exists because a
hierarchical power structure for allocating goods and labor in production for the market
can be more efficient than market contracting under certain circumstances and that the
boundaries of the firm can be explained by the relative difference in efficiencies. The
crucial insight here is that economic activities in markets and hierarchies are subject to
different types of costs. Transactions in markets have marketing costs, which include
costs associated with discovering relevant prices, negotiating and executing contracts,
and entering into long-term relationships in light of an uncertain future. Production in
hierarchies, on the other hand, have organizing costs, which include costs associated with
bureaucracy, managerial mistakes, and the loss of independence experienced by
employees. Within this line of analysis, firms are hierarchies that exist when marketing
costs exceed organizing costs for a particular business. In other words, the nature of the
firm is a hierarchy, and its purpose is cost reduction.
It was not until the 1970s when academics began to notably challenge the
traditional assumption that firms are hierarchies that exist distinctly apart from markets.
In one of the earliest attempts to blur the strict distinction between firms and markets,
Alchian and Demsetz emphatically argued that viewing the firm as a hierarchy is a
“delusion” and that the firm “has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action
any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two
people” (1972: 777). Jensen and Meckling took this insight in one further direction and
made the now influential claim that firms are “simply legal fictions which serve as a
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nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” that are employed to
depict ordinary market relations as a matter of convenience (1976: 310). Depicting the
firm as a nexus of contracts rather than a hierarchy had an important influence within the
field of microeconomics. The traditional neoclassical economic account of the firm was
a “black box” production function that unilaterally converted inputs into outputs in the
market. The theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts transformed this view by bringing
market principles inside the firm. Rather than a unilateral hierarchical relation that
converted inputs into outputs, the firm was reconceived as a complex set of bilateral
exchange relations among inputs to the firm, thus making it possible to apply
microeconomic tools to organizational analysis (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983a; 1983b;
Gibbons 2005). Furthermore, the nexus-of-contracts view of the firm quickly began to
have significant influence outside the field of economics. In law and corporate
governance, for instance, scholars quickly adopted the nexus-of-contracts view and
argued that corporate law should exist simply as default rules that instantiate “contract
terms” that a majority of firm participants would wish to adopt (e.g., Easterbrook and
Fischel 1991). And although earlier works typically argued that a majority of firm
participants would wish to establish a shareholder primacy norm, later works drawing on
the nexus-of-contracts tradition utilized the same contractual insight to argue that
managers and Boards of Directors ought to promote the interests of all of the firm’s
stakeholders rather than merely its shareholders (e.g., Blair and Stout 1999; Freeman and
Evan 1990).
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The success of the contractual metaphor in economics and organizational studies
quickly led to the adoption of the contractual metaphor within the hierarchical theory of
the firm itself. As a result, the view that a firm is a nexus of contracts is now the
dominant view of the firm. Nevertheless, underneath the semantic commonality lies a
crucial difference in both the nature and purpose of the firm depending on whether the
metaphor of contract or hierarchy dominates. For economic theories of the firm in which
the metaphor of contract dominate, the nexus of contracts is merely an overlap of
contracts that differ in no way to market contracts. Some views within this group of
theories even go as far as to argue that the firm itself is not a very helpful category for
examining complex phenomena in the markets (e.g., Gulati et al. 2000). Within this
view, the nature of the firm is merely an aggregation of market contracting at best, and
the purpose of such an aggregation lies solely in the desires of firm participants
themselves, subject only to the demands of the market for corporate governance. On the
other hand, economic theories of the firm in which the metaphor of hierarchy dominates
understand the nexus of contracts as a vertical power relation between contracting parties
that is separate from the contract itself. Within these views, the firm is a nexus of
contracts only to the extent that firm participants contract into the power relationship.
The most prominent example of such a view is that of Oliver Williamson, who argues
that the firm is an institutional structure in which organizing decisions are made by fiat
rather than through an on-going negotiation (1975; 1985; 2002). Other views within this
group of theories shift the locus of power from the manager within the firm to the Board
of Directors who govern the firm (e.g., Bainbridge 2003; Blair and Stout 1999), but the
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key insights are essentially the same. Within this view of the firm, the nature of the firm
is a hierarchical power relationship between the manager-entrepreneur, and, as will be
seen in a later section of this paper, the traditional purpose of such a power relationship is
to minimize the costs associated with transacting in the market.
Given the crucial differences in economic theories of the firm as a nexus of
contracts depending on whether the metaphor of contract or hierarchy dominates, a moral
examination of economic theories of the firm requires disaggregating the metaphors of
contract and hierarchy. Take, for instance, John Boatright’s argument that the normative
justification for the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm ultimately rests on the mutual
agreeability of the economic organization to all firm participants, assuming a fair
bargaining process and internalization of costs to third parties (2002). By conflating
theories that emphasize the element of hierarchy with those that emphasize contracts,
Boatright focuses on the moral issues associated with contracting even though his
discussion centered primarily on economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy. However,
as the next sections will attempt to show, overlooking the importance of hierarchies
within these theories can lead to a lack of attention to the ways in which the power
structure of the firm can result in the treatment of employees as a mere means, even if the
employee voluntarily agrees to such an arrangement ex ante.
III. THE IMPLICIT MORALITY OF CONTRACTS
This section begins the moral examination of economic theories of the firm by
focusing on the metaphor of contract. Although lawyers refer to contracts as legal
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enforcement mechanisms that must meet certain doctrinal criteria, economists have a
much broader understanding of contracts since they are not as concerned with legal
enforceability. For economists, contracts refer to all types of voluntary exchanges for
mutual benefit (e.g., Buchanan 1975). Thus, within economic theories of the firm, a
contract can refer not only to the mechanism for governing an exchange (e.g., Williamson
1979) but also to the very exchange relationship itself (e.g., Gibbons and Henderson
2012). However, as this section will argue, the requirement for voluntariness in
economic accounts has an important yet often overlooked moral feature. By drawing on
Kant’s moral philosophy, this section will argue that a contract cannot contradict or
ignore the will of a party to it because a truly voluntary action must respect humanity as
an end and not a mere means.
When considering contracts, economists almost always invoke the concept of
voluntariness as a requirement or a fundamental assumption. The reason for the
importance of voluntariness in economic exchange has its roots in the ultimate moral
justification of economics. Some economists explicitly appeal to a libertarian view of
freedom and self-interest to support the claim that a contract must be voluntary (e.g.,
Friedman 1962). From this view, voluntariness is obviously crucial because coercing
others into exchanges against their will would directly threaten their freedom and selfinterest. For most economists, however, the appeal to voluntariness is more indirect.
Despite the development of the concept of utility as a derived ordinal ranking of
preferences rather than a cardinal ordering of happiness, most modern economists still
implicitly rely on the concept of welfare as the ultimate value for justification (Dasgupta
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2005). Voluntariness is crucial to welfare maximization within these accounts due to the
impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. Because increases in welfare depend
on each person’s individualized set of preferences, it is impossible to know whether or
not a non-voluntary transfer of resources will lead to a net increase in welfare. On the
other hand, when individuals act on their knowledge of their own preferences to
exchange with each other voluntarily, we can confidently assume that the exchange will
have increased the welfare of at least one party to the exchange without harming the
other. As a result, voluntariness is practically taken as a given among economists. For
instance, James Buchanan, a Nobel-prize winning economist, criticizes game theory by
appealing to the “mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange,” which he takes as a
given to be “the most fundamental of all the understandings in economics” (2001: 29).
The emphasis on voluntariness is especially strong in economic theories of the firm.
Oliver Williamson, another Nobel-prize winning economist, builds on Buchanan’s
assumption to argue that private ordering, which entails efforts by transacting parties to
voluntarily craft mechanisms that align their incentives, is a key to understanding the
governance of economic exchanges, including the firm itself (2002). Other theorists of
the firm that emphasize the metaphor of contract also emphasize the need for
voluntariness in exchange (e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel 1991).
However, hidden in the requirement for voluntariness in economic theories of the
firm lies a need to consider the morality of exchange. One might think that economists
simply understand voluntariness in a thin, instrumental way. If voluntariness has value
only as a condition to ensure that exchanges lead to increases in welfare, wouldn’t it be
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sufficient for exchanges to simply be consistent with the preferences of economic actors?
However, even such a thin account of voluntariness requires considerations of morality.
At a superficial level, an evaluation of whether an exchange is consistent with our
preferences requires considerations of morality because normative concepts are
embedded within our preferences (e.g., Sen 1977). If, for instance, the preferences of
economic actors include the preference for fairness and respect, the requirement for
voluntariness will also impose a requirement for fairness and respect within the
exchange. More importantly, the consideration of preferences without reference to
objective – and thus normative – standards leads to an unacceptable account of welfare
and/or voluntariness. If economists allow for a purely subjective understanding of
welfare, they will fail to account for the distortion of preferences that are commonplace
in the market (e.g., Sen 1985). A compulsive smoker or a prisoner suffering from
Stockholm syndrome may prefer the status quo, but it would be unacceptable to think that
their actual welfare is enhanced by addiction or captivity. Similarly, a purely subjective
account of preferences leads to an unacceptable account of voluntariness itself (Olsaretti
2004). To exclude objective considerations from the requirements of voluntary action
would yield bizarre results, including the characterization of actions constrained by
mistakes of fact as nonvoluntary actions. What is needed, then, is the consideration of
normative standards to distinguish between preferences that should count and those that
should not, even for those who place a purely instrumental value on voluntariness of
exchange (Olsaretti 2006).
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One possible approach to articulating the connection between morality and
voluntariness is to look to Kant’s argument that a voluntary action proceeds from a free
will and thus requires respect for humanity as an end not a mere means (1785). For Kant,
to say that an exchange is voluntary is to say that it was freely made in accordance with
the will of each party. And the very idea of action that proceeds from a free will leads to
a moral requirement to respect humanity as an end and not a mere means. How could
this be the case? Kant argues that we can say that an action proceeds from a free will
only when it is caused by the exercise of reason. For Kant, our will is free because we
can exercise our reason to determine our action independently from our impulses. When
we tell the truth even when we desire to tell a lie, we exercise our freedom in being able
to will an action independently from our desires. A voluntary action, then, is an exercise
of our free will only to the extent that it is caused by our reason rather than our desires.
Lastly, for Kant, because the exercise of our practical rationality requires reasons for
acting, we must act for a reason that exists independently from our desires if we are to act
freely. The only reason that can exist apart from our desires, according to Kant, is our
own rational nature. Whenever we desire something, it is a necessary feature of our
rationality that we desire it for the sake of our selves. Therefore, acting freely requires
acting for the sake of our rational nature, and when we interact with other rational beings,
we must act for the sake of their rational nature as well. The Kantian respect for persons
expressed in the moral requirement to treat the humanity in ourselves and in others as an
end and not as a mere means encapsulates this requirement of the free will to act for the
sake of the rational nature in ourselves and in others.
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From a Kantian point of view, then, the requirement that contracts entail
voluntary exchanges for mutual advantage simultaneously imposes a significant moral
requirement for contracting parties to treat the humanity in themselves as ends and not as
a mere means. A contract that treats humanity as a mere means is not truly voluntary,
even if both parties consent to it. Voluntary contracting cannot consist of a brief moment
of mutual exploitation in which one uses the other as a mere instrument to get what one
wants nor be consistent with allowing one’s self to be exploited. Instead, a contract must
be consistent with the will of each party involved. Of course, it is unavoidable that we
treat each other as a means for achieving our ends when we contract with each other. If I
contract with you to buy ice cream, for instance, I am treating you as a means for getting
ice cream. However, I cannot treat the humanity in you as a mere means when we
contract with each other. To treat the humanity in myself and in others as a mere means
is to relate to myself and to others as if we did not each have independent ends of our
own by acting on terms that are not acceptable to everyone involved (O'Neill 1989). If,
for instance, a group of farmers enter into a contract to share a plot of land despite the
unwillingness of the landowner to allow them to use it, the contract is not a voluntary
exchange because its terms are not acceptable to the landowner. In such a case, the
farmers would be treating the humanity in the landowner as a mere means for the
achievement of their own ends.
Because a contract that respects the humanity of contracting parties must be
consistent with their free wills, a contract cannot contradict or ignore the wills of either
contracting party. In one family of contracts, I treat the humanity in you as a mere means
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by contradicting or ignoring your will. I contradict your will when I use a contract to
achieve a purpose you did not will. If I contract with you to sell you a barrel of oil and
then deliver a barrel full of water topped with a thin layer of oil, I act in a way that
contradicts your will to buy a barrel of oil and thus treat you as a mere means for my own
ends. I ignore your will when I effectuate an exchange unilaterally without taking your
will into consideration. If I choose to leave a barrel of oil and then take money from you
without knowing whether or not you consented to such an exchange, I wrong you by
treating you as a vending machine for my own purposes, even if you would have
consented to an exchange. In another family of contracts, I treat the humanity in myself
as a mere means by contradicting or ignoring my own will. I contradict my own will
when I act inconsistently with the very principle of willing itself. If I enter into a slavery
contract, I contradict my own will by exercising my will to act as if I could not exercise
my will at all (Kant 1797). A rock cannot enter into a contract because it cannot will
itself to do so. Contracting to become like a rock thus contradicts the very principle of
willing since it treats the idea of willing as something that negates itself. This is why the
libertarian argument that slavery contracts ought to be allowed actually represents an
illiberal position (Freeman 2001). I ignore my own will when I simply acquiesce to the
will of another in a contract. I treat the humanity in myself as a mere means for you if
you offer terms on a contract that I never really consider in light of my own will. A
contract requires that both parties will the exchange. The absence or the contradiction of
the will of either party to the exchange renders it morally impermissible.
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Nevertheless, the prohibition against contradicting or ignoring the will of
contracting parties does not imply that one cannot limit one’s own freedom through
contracts. Contracts are useful because they can help us manage the uncertainties of the
future by limiting our future actions. For instance, suppose that I run a transportation
business and would like to protect myself against the possibility of a prohibitive increase
in the price of oil in the future. I can promote my interests in a way that is consistent
with my will today by contracting with you to buy oil from you a year from now for $50
per barrel. When we enter into such a contract, we both limit the freedom of our future
selves by willing in the present to determine our actions in the future. Such a limitation
of our future selves does not contradict or ignore our wills because it is an exercise of our
own wills to limit our actions. When you act today to determine your actions tomorrow,
you are the one who determines your actions. For instance, if the price of oil increases in
the future, you are still obligated to sell oil to me at $50 per barrel because you willed it at
the time of contracting. And when I insist on performance from you in the future, I
would not be treating you as a mere means because I would be respecting the exercise of
your will today to determine your actions in the future. On the other hand, if you sell
yourself to slavery or simply acquiesce to my will, you are exercising your will to grant
me the right to determine your actions. In such an instance, you would be acting
inconsistently with the principle of voluntary action, and I would be treating you as a
mere means since I would be agreeing to value you in the future only as an instrument for
my own purposes. And as the next section will explain, the very purpose of the firm in
economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy is to grant the employer the unilateral right
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to determine the employee’s actions in the future. Therefore, it will argue, the idea of a
hierarchy within such theories is inconsistent with the idea of voluntary contracting.
IV. CONTRACTING INTO A HIERARCHY
This section discusses the attempt to justify the economic theory of the firm as a
hierarchy on contractual grounds and argues that it ultimately falls short. Some defenders
of the hierarchical theory of the firm argue that its conception of the firm is not
problematic because it presents the firm as merely an arrangement inside the firm with
functionally defined roles into which economic actors contract (e.g., Boatright 2012).
Within this view, the hierarchical theory of the firm is merely one variant of the theory of
the firm as a nexus of contracts (Bratton 1989). Putting aside semantic commonalities
and differences, however, it becomes evident that the theory of the firm as a hierarchy is
inconsistent with truly voluntary contracts. Because the very reason for a hierarchy is to
override the will of the employee when contracts run out, the employee cannot be said to
be placing limits on her future self when she contracts into a hierarchy. Instead, she
would be undermining her future capacity to exercise her free will and thus treating the
humanity in herself as a mere means. Furthermore, attempting to rescue the hierarchical
theory by granting the employee the right of free exit fails because it would collapse the
hierarchy back into a contract. In other words, the economic theory of the firm as a
hierarchy is either morally unacceptable or logical inconsistent.
Modern economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy build on the Coasian
intuition about the costs of contracting by recognizing that asset specificity and bounded
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rationality lead to hold-up problems that can frustrate market transactions. Asset
specificity refers to the ways in which investments made in an asset within the context of
a particular exchange relationship make the asset more valuable within that relationship
than in other relationships (Williamson 1985). Investments that lead to asset-specificity
are relationship-specific investments. For instance, suppose that it takes time to learn and
perfect the skill required for a manufacturer’s proprietary process of assembling widgets.
The efforts that the manufacturer expends to train the employee is a relationship-specific
investment. Learning this skill increases the asset-specificity of the employee to the firm
because the investment required to teach the employee will make her more valuable to
this particular manufacturer than to other firms. Asset specificity introduces the
possibility that, once a relationship-specific investment is made, parties to an exchange
relationship will engage in opportunistic behavior to appropriate the difference between
the value of the asset within the relationship and the value outside the relationship. For
instance, if the manufacturer values a trained worker at $25 whereas the labor market
values generic workers at $20, an employee may contract with the manufacturer at $19 to
beat out other competitors and then hold up the manufacturer by demanding $25 once it
expends the resources to train her. The possibility of being held up can lead to parties not
making relationship-specific investments, which would undermine economic efficiency,
and it can even prevent parties from entering into a contract at all if the fear of being held
up is large enough.
Asset-specificity would not lead to a hold-up problem if the manufacturer and the
worker could sign a contract that precludes any opportunistic behavior once relationship-
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specific investments have been made. Unfortunately, bounded rationality renders such
contracts extremely costly and difficult, if not impossible, to make. Bounded rationality
refers to the finite condition of human rationality (Simon 1955). It describes the ways in
which decision making is a burden on our cognitive capacities, which leads to our
inability to process the near-infinite amount of current data points to make a perfectly
rational decision, let alone begin to even anticipate and process future events. The upshot
of bounded rationality for contracting is that all of our contracts are necessarily
incomplete (Williamson 1985). Because it is impossible to anticipate at the time of
contracting all the various ways we may need to govern our exchange relationship in the
future, there will inevitably arise a situation in the future that presents an opportunity for
at least one party to take advantage of another party once a relationship-specific
investment has been made. For instance, suppose that the manufacturer and the worker
agree to a contract in which it pays her $19 to assemble widgets in accordance with its
proprietary assembly technique. To protect herself against possible exploitation in the
future, the worker will not agree to any economically feasible deal unless the contract
specifies which tasks she will be performing. But after some time, suppose that the
manufacturer wishes to alter its specified assembly technique that will double the speed
of manufacturing. Unfortunately, the new technique will require the worker to perform
an action that was not specified in their contract. The need for this change could not have
been foreseen at the time of contracting because both parties entered into their contract
under bounded rationality. The contract they signed was incomplete with respect to the
possible range of tasks that the manufacturer would want the worker to perform in the
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future. As a result of the incompleteness of the contract, the worker stands in a position
to extract more payment from the manufacturer in exchange for her compliance with the
new manufacturing technique. In fact, the costs of the negotiation and the possible payout to the worker may even force the manufacturer to abandon the new process
altogether. Lastly, because both parties know that they cannot cover all situations in the
future at the time of contracting, they may be discouraged to form a contract at all
because they are concerned about similar costs and difficulties in the future.
Modern economic theories of the firm as a hierarchy argue that the firm is an
arrangement that can preempt opportunistic behavior and thus enable mutually beneficial
exchanges and the making of relationship-specific investments to take place. Given that
the hold-up problem resulting from asset specificity and bounded rationality makes
market contracting inefficient, difficult, or impossible, it is in the economic interest of
both parties to agree to a hierarchy when contracts “run out” ex post (e.g., Blair and Stout
1999; Williamson 2002). Within a hierarchical firm, when unanticipated circumstances
arise, the incomplete nature of ex ante contracting will not raise concerns about one party
holding the other hostage because the power structure of the firm will have already
entitled one party – the manager-entrepreneur or the Board of Directors – to make a
unilateral decision as to how to allocate productive resources. This arrangement will
allow both parties to enter into economic transactions without the fear of being held up
and will allow the manager-entrepreneur to make an efficient amount of relationshipspecific investments in the employee once they enter into a relationship. For instance, the
manufacturer in the example above does not need to worry about the worker holding up
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its implementation of a new manufacturing process within a hierarchy because it entitles
the manufacturer to tell the worker what to do and obligates the worker to act under the
manufacturer’s direction. This will allow the manufacturer to not only hire the worker in
the first place but also to make an efficient amount of investment into her to make her a
more productive worker for his factory.
Unfortunately, contracting into a hierarchical firm for the reasons outlined above
treats the employee as a mere means because the purpose of the hierarchical firm is to
impose the employer’s will on the employee to compel her to perform an action that she
neither willed at the time of contracting nor willed at the time of performance. Imagine
that Alfred would like his employee, Betty, to perform an action today. His request and
her action would respect her humanity as an end if she exercises her will to perform the
action by agreeing to his request today or if she had previously exercised her will in the
past by promising to perform such an action today. Yet, there would be no need for a
hierarchy in either of these scenarios because a contract formed either today or in the past
would be sufficient to govern their interaction. If it weren’t for bounded rationality, both
Alfred and Betty would be able to prevent the hold-up problem by exercising their wills
at the time of contracting to completely determine the full range of possible actions. And
if it weren’t for Betty’s unwillingness to perform today, she would agree to Alfred’s
request even if it falls outside the bounds of their incomplete contract. The need for a
hierarchy only arises because it would be efficient for both parties to agree ex ante that
Alfred will be able to exert his will unilaterally over and against Betty’s will in
circumstances where the contract governing their relationship has “run out.”
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Unlike contracting to limit one’s freedom in the future by determining one’s
future actions at the time of contracting, contracting into a hierarchy to prevent hold-up
problems results in a contradiction of the will. When a worker contracts to perform a
service for a counterparty, she binds her future self to her current will. She never acts to
give up her capacity to exercise her will because how she acts in the future will have
already been determined by her will at the time of contracting. Similarly, when a worker
enters into a unilateral contract with a hirer of her services, he grants her the option to
perform actions that both parties anticipated and specified before she takes any action.
The granting of such an option entails that both parties have willed both the possibility of
her performing the specified action and of her not performing the specified action. On
the other hand, when a worker contracts into a hierarchy, she agrees to an arrangement
within which another person has a right to demand her to act against the will of her future
self without knowing at the time of the agreement what that action will be. By giving up
her capacity to govern her own actions and transferring it to someone else, she essentially
agrees to become a mere instrumentality of the employer in exchange for money. In this
sense, such a contract does not differ much from a contract to enter into slavery. In both
cases, the subordinate is exercising her will to enter an arrangement within which she can
no longer exercise her own will to determine her actions. Such an exercise of one’s will
contradicts the very idea of a free will and thus treats the humanity of the subordinate as a
mere means by treating her as someone who did not have a free will.
At this point, defenders of the hierarchical theory of the firm may argue that
employees retain their capacity to exercise their will because they never give up their
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right to freely exit the relationship at any time of their choosing. However, these
arguments overlook the fact that the right of exit undermines the very reason for
imposing a hierarchy in the first place. Once employees are given the right of free exit,
the hierarchical firm quickly collapses into a set of contracts. Again, as noted above, the
hierarchical firm exists as an efficient alternative to markets because it eliminates the
possibility of the employee holding up the employer in an attempt to appropriate the
value that exists within their exchange relationship. The right of free exit in a hierarchy
reintroduces this possibility because the very reason why the employee can hold up the
employer is because the employer has already made relationship-specific investments in
the employee that makes her more valuable than other potential employees. The right to
quit gives the employee enough leverage to engage in opportunistic behavior, which is
the very problem that the hierarchy was supposed to prevent.
As an illustration of the way the right of free exit undermines the very purpose of
the hierarchical firm, suppose that Betty agrees to contract into a hierarchical
arrangement within Alfred’s widget-making factory. Alfred hires Betty to assemble
various parts to produce widgets at Alfred’s direction and pays her the going rate of an
assemblyperson, which is $25 an hour. Alfred spends a significant amount of time
training Betty and teaches her his proprietary manufacturing method. Betty is a quick
learner, and, after some time, she becomes a productive worker who is worth $35 to
Alfred. Assuming that the price of a replacement worker in the labor market is still $25,
the right of free exit gives Betty an opportunity to extract more money out of Alfred. He
could pay her $5 more for several months and still be better off than if he hires someone
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new. The contract that Betty signed doesn’t protect Alfred since it gave her the right to
quit, and the hierarchy does Alfred no good since he cannot force Betty to keep working
for him for $25 once she decides that she does not want to do so anymore. In other
words, Betty’s right of free exit puts Alfred right back in the place where he would have
been if he entered into a service contract with Betty outside of the firm. The right of exit
reintroduces within the firm the very thing that the firm is intended to eliminate, i.e., the
economic inefficiencies associated with opportunistic behavior after relationship-specific
investments have been made. But what good is a firm if it does not differ from contracts
in governing the economic relationship?
To be fair, the intended level of analysis for economic theories of the firm is
organizational, where the option to exit does not exist. Most economic theories of the
firm are concerned with transaction costs at the firm level, and they offer answers to
questions that relate to market competition. Thus, the primary question for most
applications of theories of the firm is whether a firm should acquire a supplier, as GM did
with Fisher Body in 1926, or maintain a contractual relationship with it (e.g., Klein et al.
1978). And when firms purchase other firms, the purchased firm has no option to exit.
At the intended level of analysis, then, economic theories of the firm do not have much of
a problem with logical consistency when they argue that the purpose of the firm as a
hierarchy is to prevent the hold-up problem by granting the acquirer a unilateral right to
control the other party. However, insofar as theories of the firm also explain why firms
exist at all, they must be able to account for the genesis of firms. But at the individual
level of analysis, the requirement to respect the humanity of firm participants presents a
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stark choice of either denying them the right to exit for the sake of economic efficiency or
granting them the right and thus undermining the very purpose of the hierarchy. Once
taken out of the limited context of market competition and applied to broad areas of
policy, law, and morality, economic theories of the firm can offer no satisfying
explanation for the nature and purpose of firms since they must look not only at the
organizational level but also the individual level of analysis.
When economic theories of the firm appeal to a hierarchy, they are referring to
more than just an authority relation that establishes a line of command. Instead, the idea
of a hierarchy refers more specifically to a power relation within which one can override
the will of the other in effectuating the allocation of resources as one sees fit without
engaging in any inefficient renegotiation. Without this power for the
manager/entrepreneur to override the will of the employee, the idea of the firm as a
hierarchy does not offer an economic advantage over markets at all. Yet, this right to
direct the employee’s labor in accordance with the employer’s will rather than the
employee’s will goes at the heart of what it means to treat her as a mere means. When
the employer exercises his right to unilaterally direct the employee’s labor against her
wishes, she is no longer exercising her own will to determine her actions. Instead, he
treats her as a mere input for his own purposes and thus as an instrumentality of his will,
and the employee treats the humanity in herself as a mere means when she agrees to such
an agreement ex ante. Moreover, if the purpose of the firm is to minimize transaction
costs through the imposition of a hierarchy, the employee cannot contract into a hierarchy
while retaining the option to exit it because it would eliminate the very purpose of the
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hierarchy altogether. Adding the right of free exit to what seems like a hierarchical
employment contract would allow economic theories of the firm to present a picture of
the firm that approximates real life. Within the United States, for instance, the
employment relationship is typically characterized as an at-will master-servant
relationship. Unfortunately, this modification would turn the hierarchy into something
else altogether. A theory of the firm as a hierarchy that is constituted by employment
contracts with a right of exit is nothing more than a theory of the firm as a nexus of
contracts in disguise.
V. DISCUSSION
The scope of this paper is limited to pointing out the problems with how
academics and practitioners often understand the nature and purpose of the firm as a costminimizing hierarchy. Nevertheless, if the idea of contracting into a hierarchy to
minimize transaction costs is inconsistent with the moral requirements implicit within the
idea of contracting, where can we go from here? Firms are riddled with authority
relationships. Many also take as a given that some type of command hierarchy is needed
to effectively coordinate the allocation of resources for many types of production in the
modern economy (e.g., Anderson 2008). If the economic theory of the firm as a
hierarchy were correct, the seeming necessity for hierarchies would imply that we either
give up the idea that participation in firms is a voluntary activity or simply tolerate an
economic arrangement that undermines our free will because the perceived gains
outweigh the cost. Fortunately, however, there is no need to choose between these two
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options because the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy is not correct, even at a
descriptive level. As noted above, the real-life phenomenon does not match the theory at
the individual level. Although firms have no right of exit, respect for human autonomy
has led to accommodations that grant employees the right to exit at any time and only
require those who breach contracts to pay damages rather than to perform what they
promised.
One possible path forward might be to take a closer look at principles of agency
within the firm. Rather than hierarchies that reduce transactions costs, authority
relationships within the firm are more accurately characterized as agency relationships.
Currently within the United States, for instance, the relationship between the corporation
and its directors are governed by the legal principles of agency. Traditionally, the agency
relationship between the corporation and the manger has been understood to represent an
underlying agency relationship between the firm’s owners and its managers (e.g., Jensen
and Meckling 1976). From this point of view, managers, as agents, have a fiduciary
obligation to act on behalf of the interests of their principals, the shareholders
(Goodpaster 1991). But many have also argued that these agency relationships extend
even further out. For instance, when stakeholder theorists appeal to fiduciary duties to
argue that managers have a duty to a firm’s stakeholders beyond just its shareholders
(e.g., Freeman 1994), they implicitly draw on an understanding of authority relationships
between firm participants based on the principles of agency. In fact, given the
complexity of agency relationships that can exist within the firm, some have even
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suggested that the firm is best described as a nexus of agency relationships (Orts 1998;
2013).
Unlike hierarchical relationships, which are characterized by the exercise of
power over a person, agency relationships are characterized by the exercise of power that
is granted by a person. Of course, the two can coincide when one wields power over
another – legitimate authority in wielding power over another person might require that
one only exercise power over someone who has granted it, for instance – but they are
distinct concepts. As discussed above, economic theories of the firm argue that the
authority within the hierarchical firm exists to grant the hierarch a unilateral right to exert
his will over the subordinate against her will. On the other hand, agency authority only
applies to actions taken by the agent that enable the principal’s will. Thus, whereas
hierarchical power is exercised in instances that could not have been anticipated by the
contracting parties, authority in agency relationships only extends to actions that are
reasonably foreseeable by the principal (Dalley 2011). Whereas hierarchies involve the
unilateral exercise of one party’s will, then, authority exercised through agency
relationships stems from the will of both the principal and agent. An account of the firm
that incorporates the element of reasonable foreseeability along with the right of exit,
then, could go a long way toward a morally satisfactory theory of the firm.
Nevertheless, appeals to agency relationships are not sufficient to form a true
theory of the firm because a true theory of the firm must explain why firms exist at all.
Suppose, for instance, that egalitarians and other political philosophers who concede the
necessity of authority within the firm are correct. Suppose that authority relations exist in
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firms because they are somehow necessary to coordinate the complex allocation of goods
and labor within the firm. From this perspective, it may seem as if the purpose of the
firm is to provide a coordinating mechanism that is analogous to the price mechanism
within the market. Perhaps firms offer an advantage over markets because the
hierarchical authority of the manager-entrepreneur is superior than the price mechanism
in certain circumstances. But recall Coase’s criticism of Knight and his explanation for
why the hierarchical firm can be more efficient than markets. Even if the managerentrepreneur could perform as a better coordinating mechanism than the price
mechanism, why couldn’t those who would otherwise participate within the firm simply
enter into contractual arrangements to confer the manager with sufficient authority of
command to coordinate their labor? Why is a firm necessary at all? And if one were to
reply that the firm is merely a convenient shorthand for these contractual relationships,
why is there any need to appeal to a hierarchy? If the hierarchy does not exist to reduce
transactions costs by granting the manager-entrepreneur with the power to override the
will of the employee, why does it need to exist at all? The reason why a theory of the
firm must explain firms exist and what are its boundaries is because a theory that avoids
these answers provides no theory of the firm whatsoever. If one appeals simply to
pragmatic considerations for the need for authority in allocating firm resources, one does
not yet have a theory of the firm. And without a theory, one has no theoretical basis to
articulate the purpose of the firm.
Yet, if the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy does not sufficiently respect
the humanity of firm participants, what, if anything, can be salvaged from nearly a
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century of theorizing about the nature and purpose of the firm? This paper has examined
both the metaphors of contract and hierarchy because there is still much to be reclaimed
from the aspects of economic theories that look to contracts as constitutive elements of
the firm. As noted above, the universally recognized importance of voluntariness to
contracts and its connection to respect for humanity provides a strong moral foundation
for constructing a theory of the firm that treats its participants as ends and not as mere
means. Furthermore, it is pragmatically advisable that business ethicists continue to
utilize the language of contracts when discussing the nature and purpose of the firm. The
usage of the metaphor of contract is solidly entrenched not only within economics but
also the study of organizational theory and corporate governance more broadly. Business
ethicists face a steep uphill climb if they seek to reinvent the wheel and offer an entirely
new account of the firm. Yet, once the moral implications of voluntariness in contract is
made explicit, there is no need to throw out the baby with the bath water. Rather than
alienating business ethics from organizational studies, both disciplines can build on a
shared foundation to construct theories and yield applications that are both normatively
and descriptively right and powerful.
To be clear, the reliance on the contractual metaphor cannot be the whole story.
Aside from the minority of extreme theorists who claim that the very construct of a firm
is harmful for understanding and governing various modes of economic production, many
organizational scholars fully accept and utilize the contractual metaphor as a central
building block without denying the existence of firms. The team production theory of the
firm, for instance, views the firm as a distinct entity apart from markets even while
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“locat[ing] the… model… within the nexus of contracts tradition” (Blair and Stout 1999:
254). One particularly promising line of thinking about the nature and purpose of the
firm builds on the insight that the firm is comprised of not only complete but also
incomplete contracts (e.g., Coff 1999; Zingales 2000) and argues that the firm exists as a
distinct entity apart from the market because it allows for greater value to be unlocked
from combining various bundles of property rights held by firm participants (Asher et al.
2005; Kim and Mahoney 2010). Although there is more work to be done to flesh out a
theory of the firm that incorporates elements of property rights without undermining the
freedom and equality of firm participants, such theories point to such a possibility, given
the extent to which property rights are evolving and “embedded in human rights,” as
some business ethicists have claimed (Donaldson and Preston 1995: 83).
Building on the contractual metaphor of intrafirm relationships can also lead to a
variety of practical applications. For instance, the “master-servant” model of hierarchical
control is still considered to be the distinguishing factor of the employment relationship
within the law. The contractual metaphor can provide a critique to such characterizations
and point to the need for new theories of employment relationships in the law that better
respect the freedom and equality of employees. Furthermore, corporate governance
theories still often focus primarily on the principal-agent problem between shareholders
and management, both as a matter of law and practice. Because it requires that all
participants in the firm treat each other as ends in themselves rather than as mere means,
the contractual metaphor can provide reasons for not only including labor within the
governance of the firm but also for a bilateral interpretation of shareholders,
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management, and labor as all being principals and agents of each other. Lastly, viewing
employees as free and equal counterparties to a contractual relationship can change
managerial behavior because the manager and the employee must continually share
information, negotiate, and come to a shared understanding of each other’s rights and
obligations. Workplace civility, for instance, might need to be improved to better reflect
the equal and reciprocal relationship if intrafirm relationships were interpreted to be
contractual rather than hierarchical.
Lastly, to describe intrafirm relations as contractual does not necessarily exclude
considerations of efficiency in economic coordination either. There is significant reason
to think that complex forms of contracting – which include not only formal but also
informal and/or relational contractual relationships – can minimize, if not eliminate
altogether, the inefficiencies associated with market contracting (Bernstein 1992; Gilson
et al. 2009; 2010; Scott 2003). These complex forms of formal and informal contracting
have also made their way into how we describe intrafirm relationships. The emphasis on
informal and relational contracts between managers and employees has led to new
insights within theories of the firm as a nexus of contracts on how firms can leverage
intrafirm relationships to increase economic output and increase competitiveness (e.g.,
Baker et al. 2002; Gibbons 2005; Gibbons and Henderson 2012). To describe intrafirm
relationships as informal and/or relational contracts is to deny a hierarchical
characterization of the manager-employee relationship. Rather than the manager
commanding the employee from above, the manager continually negotiates with the
employee to structure their relationship in accordance with terms to which both parties
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agree. Thus, there is no need to give up on efficiency as an important value within the
firm when one incorporates the metaphor of contracts into theories of the firm because
many existing theories of the firm already utilize a robust conception of contracts to
construct efficient solutions to the problems of coordinated production. Again, contracts
cannot tell the entire story, and there is much more work to be done on this front. But
future work examining the core building blocks of the firm such as agency, property, and
contracting can build a morally acceptable theory of the firm that does not ignore
considerations of efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
Theories of the firm matter because they articulate the nature and purpose of the
firm. If we view the firm as a hierarchy that exists to reduce transactions costs by giving
the hierarch a unilateral right to exert his will over his employees, it becomes much easier
to treat what amounts to a threat to human dignity and freedom as a mere cost of doing
business. If we wish to retain the idea that market activity consists of voluntary actions
taken by individuals for their own benefit, we must revisit the idea that the firm exists as
a hierarchy. Unfortunately, we do not have a sufficiently developed theory of the firm
that stands as an alternative to the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy. For those
who wish to retain the hierarchical element within the firm, they must be able to explain
why firms exist as hierarchies and what are their boundaries. As of now, no such theory
exists.
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Yet, given the availability of alternative concepts like contracts, agency and
property, it is unclear why we would want a theory of the firm to incorporate hierarchies
at all. Why shouldn’t business ethicists and organizational theorists work together to
construct a new theory of the firm that looks to contracts as foundational elements that
constitute the firm? By looking to agency relationships and property rights to supplement
the idea that firms are constituted by contracts, we may be able to articulate a new
purpose of the firm that is consistent with the dignity and freedom of all of its
participants. And once a new purpose is articulated, we will be able to take the next steps
in aligning our reality and practice with our new theory. We may even be able to
contribute to new legal frameworks, arrangements for corporate governance, and
managerial practices that are consistent with our moral intuitions about how we organize
into firms to coordinate our productive activities.

37
ESSAY 2:
Profit and Fair Play: How Economic Theories Of Entrepreneurship Can Help Us
Recognize An Employee When We See One

I. INTRODUCTION
Distinguishing employees from independent contractors and other types of
workers is not an easy task.1 Nevertheless, employee status is a necessary and important
category in legal analysis in a variety of ways. First, employee status plays an important
role in demarcating the tort liability of the employer. Because employees are considered
to be agents of employers in ways that are mostly not the case for other types of workers
and service providers, employers are often held liable for the actions of their employees
even though they would not be liable for the same actions of others working on their
behalf.2 The primary rationale for imposing liability on employers in this way is because
employees are assumed to be acting as an extension of the employer, whereas nonemployees are not.3 Second, employee status subjects the employer to a variety of

1

See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It
Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295 (2001).
2
This doctrine is known as the doctrine of respondeat superior. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §219(1) (“A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment.).
3
To say that employees are acting as extensions of the employer can be interpreted differently within
different tort theories. For instance, corrective justice theories of tort law view employees as moral
extensions of employers when respondeat superior applies. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW, 187 (1995) (“Where the faulty actor is sufficiently integrated into the enterprise and where
the faulty act is sufficiently close to the assigned task, the law constructs a more inclusive legal persona,
the-employer-acting-through-the-employee, to whom responsibility can be ascribed.”). On the other hand,
economic theories of tort law are likely to view employees as extensions of the employer as a risk-taking
enterprise, at least insofar as efficient risk-taking is concerned. See, e.g., Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in
Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544 (7th Cir. 1987) (“All the details of
the common law independent contractor doctrine having to do with the right to control the work are
addressed to identifying the best monitor and precaution-taker.”). Regardless of the finer differences,
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statutory obligations spanning virtually every aspect of the employer-employee
relationship, including those pertaining to wages, hours, benefits, retirement, and taxes.4
Although the specific reasons for imposing a statutory obligation differs from one statute
to another, the general principle that underlies most of employee protection laws is the
protection of workers who are vulnerable and disadvantaged.5 For instance, the preamble
to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) points to the “inequality of bargaining
power between employees… and employers” and states that one of its purposes is to
protect workers by “restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees.”6 Third, employee status can play an important role in delineating the
employer’s rights to resources and opportunities that can be exploited for business
purposes. For instance, employers have property rights over work products created by
their employees whereas they do not have such rights over similar products of nonemployees.7 Similarly, some employees have fiduciary duties to respect the business

however, the central ideas that motivate the justifications is that there is some important connection
between the employer and employee that, for the most part, does not exist between a business entity and its
contractual partners.
4
For instance, only employees are protected by many significant federal laws, including the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §152(2)-(3); the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§158(b)(4)(i); the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §1002 (5)-(6); the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §201(2); the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §2611(3); the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §630(f); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19990, 42 U.S.C. §1211(3).
5
See, e.g., Carlson supra note 1, at 354 (“statutory purpose nearly always leads in the same direction:
broad statutory coverage of economically dependent workers”).
6
29 U.S.C. §151
7
For instance, although ownership of a copyright typically resides in the author of the work, ownership of a
work created by an employee vests in the employer. See, e.g., Natkin v. Winfrey, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1003
(N.D. Ill. 2000); 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title.”).
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interests and opportunities of their employers in ways that independent contractors do
not.8
However, despite the legal importance of distinguishing employees from other
types of workers, there is a significant lack of clarity or consensus on how the law ought
to do so.9 The control test rooted within the common law of agency is the oldest and
most widely recognized legal test for determining employee status, and it largely
emphasizes the control that an employer has over the employee.10 Because the doctrine
of respondeat superior is predicated on the theory that employees are acting as an
extension of their employer in some way, the focus on control is theoretically well-suited
for adjudicating classification issues that pertain to tort liability. Unfortunately, the test
for control does not address all the relevant issues that motivate the myriad of statutory
protections for employees.11 A widely accepted alternative is known as the “economic
realities test,” and it emphasizes the economic dependence of employees to their

8

See, e.g., Midwest Ink Co. v. Graphic Ink Sys., No. 98 C 7822, 2003 WL 360089 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2003)
(ruling for the defendant, who argued that he did not owe any fiduciary duties to the plaintiff because he
was an independent contractor rather than an employee).
9
See, e.g., Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So.2d 143, 150 (Miss. 1994) (“various tests to
determine the type of relationship are themselves generalities which can be viewed quite differently,
depending upon which judge is applying them.”).
10
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07(3)(a) (2006) (“an employee is an agent whose
principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work”).
11
See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2003); Carlson, supra
note 1; Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 75 (1984); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187
(1999); Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for Amending
Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239
(1997).
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employers.12 Unfortunately, although economic dependence of one party to another
might signify some imbalance of bargaining power that motivates many employment
protection statutes in theory, the economic realities test captures neither economic reality
nor economic dependence. It fails to capture economic reality because economic
dependence does not really distinguish employees from other types of workers.
Employers are just as likely to be economically dependent on employees, and many
independent contractors are likely to be just as economically dependent on their clients as
employees are to their employers.13 Furthermore, it fails to capture economic
dependence because, in practice, the economic realities test often has no practical
difference with the control test, with courts tending to focus on factors that are shared by
both.14 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that both tests are too convoluted and
involve so many different factors that they are very difficult to provide consistent
guidance to courts, businesses, and workers.15
As an alternative to both the control test and the economic realities test, there has
been a recently growing acceptance of the view that an employee is someone who is not

12

See, e.g., Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mares v. Marsh, 777
F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985)) (the economic realities test focuses on “whether the employee realistically
is dependent upon the business to which he or she renders service”).
13
See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 479, 482 (2016) (noting that “plenty of classic contractors are economically
dependent upon their clients, and employers are often economically dependent upon their employees.”);
Linder, supra note 11; Maltby & Yamada, supra note 11.
14
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §1.01 Reporters’ Notes (noting the “lack of any sharp
distinction between the common-law test... and a multifactor economic-realities test”); Murray v. Principal
Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “there is no functional difference between the
three formulations” of employee status expressed by the common law agency test, the economic realities
test, and a common law hybrid test).
15
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1.
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an working as an entrepreneur.16 The D.C. Circuit, in particular, has embraced this “shift
of emphasis to entrepreneurialism”17 by endorsing a new test that focuses on the
entrepreneurial opportunities of workers.18 Under what is now known as the
entrepreneurial opportunities test, the court focuses “not upon the employer's control of
the means and manner of the work but instead upon whether the putative independent
contractors have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss” to determine
whether or not a worker is an employee.19 The assumption that animates this focus on
entrepreneurial opportunity is that an employee is not involved with the “opportunities
and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism,”20 whereas an independent contractor “takes
economic risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit.”21 Although there is some
concern that the entrepreneurial opportunities test is inconsistent with the Supreme Court
precedent in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden,22 the D.C. Circuit has
continued to look to it as a guidepost for other NLRA claims.23 And other courts, even as
they decline to apply the entrepreneurial opportunities test, have begun to consider the
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §1.01(b) (“An individual renders services as an
independent businessperson and not as an employee when the individual in his or her own interest exercises
entrepreneurial control over important business decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign
assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether and when to provide service to
other customers.”).
17
Corp. Exp. Delivery Sys. v. N.L.R.B., 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Corporate
Express Delivery Systems].
18
The court first articulated the “entrepreneurial opportunities” test in Corporate Express Delivery Systems
and affirmed it in FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) [hereinafter FedEx
Home Delivery].
19
Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
FedEx Home Delivery, at 497.
21
Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780.
22
503 U.S. 318 (1992). For a discussion on the inconsistency of the entrepreneurial opportunities test with
Supreme Court precedent, see, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 353, 357 (2011) (noting that the test “directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent”). See also Judge
Garland’s dissenting opinion in FedEx Home Delivery.
23
See, e.g., Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 822 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
16
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availability of entrepreneurial opportunities as an important factor for determining
employee status.24
Unfortunately, what is missing from this recent focus on entrepreneurship is a
theoretical understanding of what entrepreneurship actually is and why it matters. Courts
often seem to rely on common sense notions of entrepreneurship as profit seeking and/or
risk taking.25 Scholars who look to economic theory to inform their arguments within
this context only mention the entrepreneur tangentially as part of their examination of
economic theories of the firm rather than as their main focus.26 Neither approach has had
any traction with contemporary entrepreneurship research. As a response to this lack of
attention to the theoretical underpinnings of entrepreneurship, this paper looks to
economic theories of entrepreneurship, which have been very influential for framing
entrepreneurship research, to supply criteria for determining whether a worker is acting
as an entrepreneur. In doing so, it attempts to better inform the increased attention to the
element of entrepreneurship and ground it within a scholarly tradition.

See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In finding that the
incidents of the relationship between Friendly and its drivers militate in favor of ‘employee’ status, we
place particular significance on Friendly's requirement that its drivers may not engage in any
entrepreneurial opportunities.”). See also Doud v. Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (D. Nev.
2015) and Crew One Prods., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 811 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2016).
25
See, e.g., Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780. (“The full-time cook and the executive are
employees and the lawn-care provider is an independent contractor not because of the degree of supervision
under which each labors but because of the degree to which each functions as an entrepreneur — that is,
takes economic risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just
harder.”).
26
See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661
(2013). See also Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work contract as
Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083 (2015).
24
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Although contemporary theories of entrepreneurship abound in a variety of ways,
almost all entrepreneurship scholars build on the following three classic theories of
entrepreneurship – Frank Knight’s work on risk and uncertainty27, Joseph Schumpeter’s
work on creative destruction28, and Israel Kirzner’s work on entrepreneurial alertness29.
The foundational theory of entrepreneurship is that of Frank Knight. Knight argues that
entrepreneurs assume ultimate responsibility for the business enterprise – a concept that
this paper will refer to as entrepreneurial responsibility. Within Knight’s framework,
entrepreneurial responsibility consists of both exercising control over the enterprise and
assuming a type of risk he describes as uncertainty. 30 Economic uncertainty refers to the
type of risk that cannot be calculated or known in advance.31 It exists because supply and
demand in the market is unpredictable, and entrepreneurs are those who assume liability
for such unpredictability. Joseph Schumpeter offers greater elaboration on the control

27

See, generally, FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921) [hereinafter RISK,
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT].
28
See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934) [hereinafter
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]; Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Creative Response in Economic
History, 7 J. ECON. HIST. 149 (1947) [hereinafter Creative Response]; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942) [hereinafter CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY].
29
See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (1973) [hereinafter COMPETITION
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP]; Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market
Process: An Austrian approach, 35 J. ECON. LIT 60 (1997) [hereinafter Entrepreneurial Discovery]; Israel
M. Kirzner, The Alert and Creative Entrepreneur: A Clarification 32 SMALL BUS. ECON. 145 (2009).
30
See, e.g., RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 271 (“The essence of enterprise is the specialization of the
function of responsible direction of economic life, the neglected feature of which is the inseparability of
these two elements, responsibility and control…. Any degree of effective exercise of judgment, or making
decisions, is in a free society coupled with a corresponding degree of uncertainty-bearing, of taking the
responsibility for those decisions.”).
31
See RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 233 (“To preserve the distinction… between the measurable
uncertainty and an unmeasurable one we may use the term ‘risk’ to designate the former and the term
‘uncertainty’ for the latter…. The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is
that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through
calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the
reason being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is
in a high degree unique.”).
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element of entrepreneurial responsibility. He argues that entrepreneurship is the creative
destruction of an existing economic equilibrium through the introduction of a new good,
method of production, market, source of supply of materials, or organization of
industry.32 Entrepreneurs are those who exercise their right to control such means of
production, which is necessary for taking productive assets out of their existing usage, to
allocate them for new ways of usage.33 Israel Kirzner, on the other hand, emphasizes a
different – yet ultimately complementary – view of the entrepreneur. He argues that
entrepreneurship consists of bringing the market closer to equilibrium by discovering and
exploiting previously overlooked opportunities to profit from an existing market
inefficiency.34 The Kirznerian entrepreneur is alert to potential inefficiencies and acts
boldly to correct the market by buying where prices are too low and selling where prices
are too high.35
Taken together, the three classic theories of entrepreneurship can yield a
justifiable and workable three-part test – which I will refer to as the entrepreneurial
responsibilities test – for courts to determine whether or not a worker is an employee.
Rather than control, economic dependence, or the existence of entrepreneurial
opportunities, the entrepreneurial responsibilities test focuses on whether or not the
worker assumes entrepreneurial responsibility for her work. Economic theories of

32

See, generally, THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
Id., at 68 (“command over means of production is necessary to the carrying out of new combinations.”).
34
See, generally, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP.
35
See, e.g., Entrepreneurial Discovery, at 70 (“The daring, alert entrepreneur discovers these earlier errors,
buys where prices are ‘too low’ and sells where prices are ‘too high.’ In this way low prices are nudged
higher, high prices are nudged lower; price discrepancies are narrowed in the equilibrative direction.”).
33
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entrepreneurship can supply courts with three elements that are necessary for workers to
assume entrepreneurial responsibility. The first element is the Knightian element, and it
looks to whether or not the worker assumes liability for economic uncertainty. The
second element is the Schumpeterian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker
exercises control over the allocation of resources being combined to sell in the market.
The third element is the Kirznerian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker
participates in the market process by buying resources to sell in the market to earn a
profit.
Aside from its simplicity and wide-ranging applicability, the entrepreneurial
responsibilities test is superior to other existing tests for employee status because it
corresponds with the principle of fair play and the very reasons why we organize our
economic activities within markets and firms. The principle of fair play holds that,
“when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus
restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a
right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission.”36 Both
markets and firms are such joint enterprises that offer benefits and restrictions. Markets
subject economic actors to high-powered incentives, where the market actor is exposed to
the entirety of full potential gains or losses that accompany a transaction. The firm is an
alternative arrangement that can shield economic actors from the incentive structure of
the market by offering low-powered incentives, where the firm actor, i.e., the employee,

36

H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185 (1955). See also John Rawls,
Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (Sidney Hook, ed. 1964).
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captures neither the full gains nor bears the full losses associated with her economic
activity.37 Within such a scheme, I will argue, the principle of fair play suggests that it
would be unfair for economic actors to benefit privately by circumventing the bifurcation
of work into markets and firms in our economic system, which are intended for the
benefit of all participants. This principle can explain and justify a wide variety of the
need for distinguishing employees from independent contractors in a parsimonious and
unified way. From traditional grounds of inquiry like vicarious liability and various
worker protections to other tangentially related topics like owner property rights, the
entrepreneurial responsibilities test can provide a principled way for courts to distinguish
those who require the protection of the law.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Part II, I outline both the control test and the
economic realities test and assess the underlying rationales that animate the tests and
employee status. I also discuss the entrepreneurial opportunities test as articulated by the
D.C. Circuit and point to the need to examine the concept of entrepreneurship more
closely and to justify it in a principled way. In Part III, I provide the theoretical
underpinning of the entrepreneurial responsibilities test by describing economic theories
of entrepreneurship provided by Knight, Schumpeter, and Kirzner. In Part IV, I
introduce the entrepreneurial responsibilities test and connect the test’s three elements

37

High-powered incentives in markets can lead to costly transactions because they can encourage
opportunistic behavior between transaction parties. From a transactions cost economics perspective, firms
offer an advantage over markets in reducing the costs associated with opportunism by substituting out highpowered incentives for low-powered ones. For more on the relative differences in the intensity of
incentives within markets and firms and how it leads to the relative advantages of each arrangement, see,
e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
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with the three theories of entrepreneurship described above. I also apply the proposed
test to worker misclassification in the sharing economy by showing how it fares better
than other existing tests in classifying Uber drivers differently from taxi drivers. Then, in
Part V, I justify the entrepreneurial responsibilities test by describing the principle of fair
play, discussing the distinction between markets and firms as alternate systems of
economic organization, and connecting the structure of our economic system with the
various ways in which worker misclassification can lead to unfairness. I close in Part VI.
II. EXISTING TESTS FOR EMPLOYEE STATUS
Although distinguishing employees from other types of workers is critical for
determining coverage under a variety of federal and state employment statutes, most
statutes do not offer a satisfactory definition of who is an employee. The Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)38, for instance, simply defines a non-governmental employee as
“any individual employed by an employer,”39 an employer as “any person acting directly
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,”40 and to employ
as “to suffer or permit to work.”41 Other federal and state statutes have also typically
followed the tactic of leaving the definitions open.42 As a result, courts have often looked

38

29 U.S.C. §§ 209-219
Id. § 203(e)(1)
40
Id. § 203(d)
41
Id. § 203(g)
42
For other federal statutes, see, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (“The
term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer”), the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (“The term “employee” means any individual employed by an
employer”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (“The term
“employee” means an individual employed by an employer.”). For the vacuous definitions of employees in
state statutes and the need for a legal test in such contexts, see, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 296 n.5, along
with infra notes 63, 79, 80, and accompanying texts.
39
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to a confusing and uncertain set of common law tests to determine whether a worker is an
employee or an independent contractor.43
This section assesses the two most commonly used tests for determining
employee status – the control test rooted within the common law of agency and the
economic realities test – and introduces the entrepreneurial opportunities test, which is a
more recently articulated standard under the NLRA. It will argue that the control test,
while well-suited for adjudicating classification issues that pertain to tort liability, does
not account for the myriad of purposes that motivate the various statutory protections for
employees. Furthermore, despite its purported focus on economic dependence, it will
argue that the economic realities test corresponds to neither economic reality nor
economic dependence. Lastly, it will discuss the emergence of the entrepreneurial
opportunities test and argue that it requires a greater examination of entrepreneurship and
why it should matter for determining employee status.
A) Assessing the control test
The control test has its origins within the common law governing the masterservant relationship in England.44 Under the English common law, “the master is
answerable for the act of his servant, if done by his command, either expressly given, or

See, e.g., Kisner v. Jackson, 132 So. 90, 91 (Miss. 1931) (“There have been many attempts to define
precisely what is meant by the term ‘independent contractor’; but the variations in the wording of these
attempts have resulted only in establishing the proposition that it is not possible within the limitations of
language to lay down a concise definition that will furnish any universal formula, covering all cases.”)
44
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 302 (“The "master-servant" relationship… is widely regarded as the
pre-industrial precursor of the "employer-employee" relationship”). See also Gerald M. Stevens, The Test
of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. R. 188 (1939).
43
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implied.”45 The rationale for holding the master liable for the servant’s actions stemmed
from the master’s oversight of his servants. If an innkeeper’s servant robs a customer, for
instance, the innkeeper is liable for the robbery because “there is a confidence reposed in
him, that he will take care to provide honest servants.”46 And despite the dramatic
change in labor relationships during the Industrial Revolution, English courts continued
to look to the master-servant relationship as a guide for determining whether an employer
or a worker was to be held liable for the torts of the worker. And in looking to the
master-servant relationship, English courts focused primarily on whether the employer
exercised control over the worker’s actions.47
The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor within the
United States first became important as courts struggled to apply the common law
governing the master-servant relationship within the context of worker’s compensation
laws during the Industrial Revolution.48 As a result, American jurisprudence for
classifying employees also relied on the English master-servant model predicated on
whether the employee was acting under the employer’s command to determine the
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WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 417 (1765).
Id.
47
See, e.g., Sadler v. Henlock, 119 Eng. Rep. 209, 212 (1855) (“The test here is, whether the defendant
retained the power of controlling the work. No distinction can be drawn from the circumstance of the man
being employed at so much a day or by the job. I think that here the relation was that of master and
servant, not of contractor and contractee.”).
48
See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 44, at 189 (“The relation of employer and employee is, of course, that
formerly known under the title of master and servant. The shift to the first terminology seems to have
accompanied the development of workmen's compensation legislation, which makes clear the substantial
identity of the two. And it was in determining the scope of vicarious liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior that definition of this relation became important.”).
46
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employer’s liability for the employee’s actions.49 And even today, the test for
determining whether an employer ought to be liable for the employee’s actions typically
rests on the principles of agency, which emphasize the element of control that the
principal has over the agent.50 For instance, in Carter v. Reynolds, the New Jersey
Supreme Court looked to the common law principles of agency to rule that an accounting
firm was liable for the negligent driving of a part-time worker on her way home from
work because its requirement that she drive her personal vehicle amounted to an exercise
of control over her.51 Similarly, in St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff, the Texas Supreme Court
ruled that a surgical resident involved in a malpractice case was an employee of a health
organization formed for the purpose of operating a residency program based primarily on
the degree of control that the foundation had over the resident.52
Given its origins, the control test intuitively seems well-suited for determining
whether or not the employer should be held vicariously liable for the actions of the
worker. Under the laws of agency, the employer is liable for the consequences of his

See, e.g., Pelow v. Oswego Const. Co., 162 A.D. 840, 841 (1916) (“an employer is made liable for
personal injuries… by reason of the negligence of any person intrusted with authority to direct, control, or
command any employe in the performance of the duty of such employe.”).
50
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (“A servant is a person employed to perform
services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control.”). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 7.07(3)(a) (“an employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and
means of the agent’s performance of work”).
51
Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 416, (2003) (“When an employer requires an employee to use a
personal vehicle, it exercises meaningful control over the method of the commute by compelling the
employee to foreswear the use of carpooling, walking, public transportation, or just being dropped off at
work.”)
52
St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 541 (Tex. 2002) (“The above discussion makes clear there are
a number of factors affecting whether and when vicarious liability is appropriate. Paramount among those
factors, however, is whether the person being held responsible can be said to have had a right to control the
activities of the wrongdoer.”).
49
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employee’s actions undertaken during the course of her employment,53 whereas he is
generally not liable for the actions of an independent contractor.54 The reason for such a
distinction is often thought to rest on the relative difference in the degrees of control
exercised by the employer over the worker.55 When an employer sufficiently controls the
worker, it seems intuitive that it is the employer and not the worker who is responsible
for mitigating the harm to others. When there is no such control, however, the worker
can be thought to be acting independently from the employer and thus personally
responsible for the harms caused to others. Furthermore, when a worker acts under the
control of the employer, the worker can be thought to be sufficiently connected to the will
of the employer so as to express the employer’s will in his actions.56 And insofar as the
worker is an instrumentality of the employer, it does not seem unreasonable to treat the
two parties as one composite entity for apportioning liability.57
However, the application of the control test is no longer limited to determining
whether or not the employer ought to be vicariously liable for the actions of the worker.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (“An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by
employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”).
54
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (“the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.”). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410 – 429 for exceptions to this general rule, which include various
circumstances related to the wrongful actions or omissions of the employer.
55
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt b (“The explanation for it most commonly given
is that, since the employer has no power of control over the manner in which the work is to be done by the
contractor, it is to be regarded as the contractor's own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the
proper party to be charged with the responsibility of preventing the risk, and bearing and distributing it.”).
56
See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 417 (“[the master’s] negligence is a kind of implied consent to
the robbery”).
57
See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, at 187 (1995). See also Fruit v. Schreiner, 502
P.2d 133, 141 (Alaska 1972) (“Employees' acts sufficiently connected with the enterprise are in effect
considered as deeds of the enterprise itself.”).
53
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In fact, unless otherwise specified by statute or case law, courts will typically default to
the common law of agency to determine whether a worker is an employee or an
independent contractor.58 For instance, federal courts focus on thirteen factors that
pertain to “the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product
is accomplished”59 for the purposes of determining employee status under a variety of
federal statutes, including the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA),60 the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)61, and the NLRA.62 State courts have also
followed suit and typically rely on the federal common law test for a wide variety of state
statutes involving employee protections that mirror the federal statutes as well.63
Unfortunately, the focus on the employer’s control over the worker does not make
much sense when applied outside the vicarious liability context. For instance, the
purpose of ERISA is, among others, to protect “the interests of participants in private

See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (“In the past, when
Congress has used the term “employee” without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”).
59
Id., at 751-752 (“In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.”)
(footnotes omitted).
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See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
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See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003).
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See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
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See, e.g., Strother v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) (“we look to
federal cases in those areas that have addressed whether an individual labeled as a partner can be
considered an employee for the purpose of employment discrimination laws.”). See also Frishberg v.
Esprit De Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 793, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Since New York law distinguishes between
employees and independent contractors in a sufficiently similar manner, the court will use the federal test
for both state and federal claims.”).
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pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the
soundness of such plans.”64 It is difficult to imagine a justifiable connection between the
employer’s control over the worker and the fairness of worker retirement plans.
Nevertheless, the control test allows employers to deny revoke employment benefits for a
long-time worker who would have otherwise been protected under ERISA.65 The
connection between control and the aims of other statutes for which the control test is
used – whether it is the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities66 or the correction of the inequalities of bargaining power between capital and
labor67 – are similarly too attenuated to justify the control test as an appropriate rule for
determining employee status.
Furthermore, the very notion of control is problematic for courts attempting to
distinguish employees from independent contractors. What does it mean for an employer
to control an employee? Within the control test, the traditional meaning of control
pertains to the employer’s supervision of the means and manner of production in addition
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29 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
In the events leading up to Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, the trial court first granted summary
judgment to the employer after determining that the worker did not qualify for employee status under the
control test. The rationale for the holding can be found in an opinion that overturned it. Darden v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Under such traditional common law
principles, Darden most probably would not qualify as an employee.”).
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42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (“It is the purpose of this chapter--(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;(2) to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities”).
67
29 U.S.C. § 151 (“The inequality of bargaining power between employees… and employers…
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce…. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing”).
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to its results.68 However, because the distinction between the means and results of a task
depends on how narrowly the task is defined, control test can yield different results
purely based on the definition of the worker’s task.69 Furthermore, because a narrow
specification of the results of a task can lead to an effective control over the means of
carrying it out, the control test allows for a great deal of manipulation by clever
employers.70 Lastly, because control can be exercised in subtle and informal ways, it is
difficult for courts to determine whether or not the employer exercised control or had the
right of control over the worker, particularly when control determines employee status
across the board rather than within the particular context of the legal dispute.71 Given not
only the misfit between the purpose of the control test and its subsequent application but
also issues with taking control as a primary determining factor for employee status, then,
it comes as no surprise that courts have continued to look for other options.

See, e.g., C.C. E., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Although this right-to-control
test requires an evaluation of all the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the company and
the worker, the extent of the actual supervision exercised by a putative employer over ‘the means and
manner’ of the workers' performance is the most important element to be considered. It is important,
however, to distinguish such company supervision from company efforts merely to monitor, evaluate, and
improve the results or ends of the worker's performance. Supervision of the means and manner of the
worker's performance renders him an employee, while steps taken to monitor, evaluate, and improve the
results of his work, without supervision over the means by and manner in which he does his work, indicates
that the worker is an independent contractor.”) (citations, italicization, and internal quotation markets
omitted).
69
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 340 (“A plumber, for example, might be a contractor if installing good
plumbing is a discrete end the parties seek to achieve, and where the owner or general contractor wishes to
have no involvement in the details of the plumbing. Conversely,… [i]f building a house is the goal,… there
is an argument that the plumber's entire work is but a detail under the general contractor's control, and the
plumber is therefore an employee.”).
70
See, e.g., Tomassetti, supra note 26, at 1099 (“the means-ends standard is amenable to nearly infinite
manipulation. Courts can always find some residual discretion left to the putative contractor, and they can
describe the "ends" at the level of detail necessary for the employer to maintain complete control.”).
71
See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1, at 340-342.
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B) Assessing the economic realities test
Even while courts were frequently looking to the master-servant model and its
emphasis on control, some courts were looking at a more expansive set of criteria to
distinguish employees from independent contractors. In Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v.
Yensavage, for instance, a coal mine refused to pay statutorily required compensation to
its miners for work-related injuries because its miners were merely independent
contractors who wholly assumed the risk of their activities.72 In holding that the mine
owed “the duties of a master to a servant” to its miners, Judge Learned Hand looked to
the economic disadvantage of the miners relative to the mine along with the purpose of
the statute.73 Since Lehigh Valley, courts have attempted at times to look to the purpose
of the relevant statute to hold that the determination of employee status ought to look to
the economic relationship between the employer and the worker rather than to the formal
elements of control and the common law of agency, with limited success.74
And despite the focus on the control test in the past few decades, the part of the
Lehigh Valley approach that looks to the economic relationship between the employer
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218 F. 547 (2d Cir. 1914).
Id., at 552–53 (“the whole purpose of such statutes… are meant to protect those who are at an economic
disadvantage…. It is absurd to class such a miner as an independent contractor in the only sense in which
that phrase is here relevant. He has no capital, no financial responsibility. He is himself as dependent upon
the conditions of his employment as the company fixes them as are his helpers.”).
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See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (“Whether, given the intended
national uniformity, the term ‘employee’ includes such workers as these newsboys must be answered
primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the legislation.”) and United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704,
713 (1947) (“We concluded that, since that end was the elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife,
‘employees' included workers who were such as a matter of economic reality.”). Both Hearst and Silk,
along with their focus on statutory purpose, were later overturned in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318 (1992).
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and the worker – now known as the economic realities test – has persisted within a
narrow range of cases that arise out of FLSA’s definition of employees. As noted above,
FLSA defines the verb “to employ” to include “to suffer or permit to work.”75 Due to
this expansive definition, federal courts have applied what is now known as the economic
realities test to determine employee status for claims arising out of FLSA76 and, because
it utilizes FLSA’ definitions of employ and employee,77 the Family Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA).78 Many state courts have also followed suit and applied the economic
realities test for claims relevant to wage and hour protections.79 Other states adopt the
economic realities test for other claims as well.80
The exact application of the economic realities test varies depending on
jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions look to a limited set of factors such as “(1) control of a
worker's duties, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the right to hire and fire and the right to
discipline, and (4) the performance of the duties as an integral part of the employer's
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29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (U.S. 1992) (FLSA’s expansive
definition “stretches the meaning of “employee” to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under
a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”). See also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y
of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (“The test of employment under the Act is one of economic reality”)
(quotations omitted).
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29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (“The terms ‘employ’, ‘employee’, and ‘State’ have the same meanings given such
terms in subsections (c), (e), and (g) of section 203 of this title.”).
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See, e.g., Nichols v. All Points Transp. Corp. of Michigan, 364 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(“Because the statutory definition of FMLA, unlike the definition found in ERISA, incorporates the FLSA's
broader definition of ‘employee’ and ‘employ,’ the court will continue to apply the “economic realities”
test as described by the Sixth Circuit”).
79
See, e.g., Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Case Farms, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 312, 314, (1997)
(“The North Carolina Wage and Hour Act is modeled after the Fair Labor Standards Act…. Several factors
used by federal jurisdictions to determine ‘employee’ status under the FLSA are equally useful in the
context of the Wage and Hour Act”).
80
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Mobil Oil Corp., 827 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (“Michigan courts
rely on the ‘economic realities test’ to establish the existence of an employer/employee relationship.”).
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business towards the accomplishment of a common goal.”81 Other jurisdictions take a
more expansive approach to cover factors such as “1) the nature and degree of the alleged
employer's control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged
employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; 3) the
alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his
employment of workers; 4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 5) the
degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; 6) the extent to which the
service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.”82 Whatever the
specific test, however, the general thrust of the economic realities test is intended to look
beyond a formal specification of factors to determine the employee’s economic
dependence on the employer.83
One rationale offered to justify the economic realities test is that those who are
economically dependent on their employers are particularly vulnerable in the market due
to their lack of bargaining power, whereas those who have greater bargaining power
would only be limited by mandatory regulation on what they can negotiate in light of
their preferences.84 For instance, low-skilled laborers are dependent on their employers
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Askew v. Macomber, 398 Mich. 212, 217–18, (1976).
Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987).
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See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 11, at 112-113 (“Control of employment opportunities is the linchpin of the
economic realities test, viewed from the perspective of the employee's dependency on the employer and
vulnerability to discriminatory conduct. This focus requires an analysis of the economic terms of particular
relationships on a case-by-case basis, rather than on the basis of a catalogue of immutable factors. The
flexibility of this analysis is essential to avoid the rigidity of the common law test and to accommodate the
present range of employment relationships and the new patterns that may evolve in the future.”).
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See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1544–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (J.
Easterbrook concurring) (“Indeed, the details of independent contractor relations are fundamentally
contractual. Firms can structure their dealings as ‘employment’ or ‘independent contractor’ to maximize
the efficiency of incentives to work, monitor, and take precautions…. The FLSA is designed to defeat
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because they lack the ability to obtain higher paying jobs elsewhere. This lack of
bargaining power makes them vulnerable to an employer who wishes to maximize his
profits by forcing his workers to endure long hours for little pay. Since low-skilled
laborers would have no choice but to accept such an arrangement, it might be appropriate
for the law to institute minimum standards out of respect for worker rights, dignity, or
autonomy. A more skilled worker, on the other hand, has sufficient bargaining power to
walk away from such an arrangement. If a more skilled worker agrees to work long
hours for little pay, the theory goes, it must be because he enjoys the work or has other
valid reasons that courts ought to respect. Mandatory standards will only frustrate the
high-skilled worker’s ability to negotiate for what she prefers.
In theory, a test for employee status that emphasized the economic dependence of
a worker to the employer could go a long way to address a variety of purposes that
animate the patchwork of labor and employment law in the United States. For instance,
FLSA addresses substandard labor conditions,85 and for reasons mentioned above, the
economic dependence of a worker could be a good proxy for those who lack the
bargaining power to negotiate for better working conditions. Similarly, the NLRA,
which directly addresses the inequality of power between employers and workers,86 could
benefit from limiting required collective bargaining rights to those who lack the market
power to demand favorable terms on their own. Even cases involving vicarious liability
rather than implement contractual arrangements…. In this sense ‘economic reality’ rather than contractual
form is indeed dispositive. The migrant workers are selling nothing but their labor. They have no physical
capital and little human capital to vend.”).
85
29 U.S.C. § 202.
86
29 U.S.C. § 151.
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could benefit from a focus on the relative lack of bargaining power among workers. A
worker with relatively high bargaining power could demand that the employer indemnify
her for potential harms caused by her actions. The structure of the allocation of risk
within such a context could depend on the particular context to lead to the most efficient
outcome. A worker with little bargaining power, on the other hand, has no ability to
bargaining for indemnification. Since an employer would always prefer to protect
himself against liability for the actions of his workers, economically dependent workers
would be forced to agree to a contract that indemnifies the employer, even if it would be
socially inefficient to do so. Furthermore, since workers with little bargaining power
often have little resources to pay damages, victims of their torts would also have little
recourse if the law allowed employers to shield themselves through such indemnification
contracts.
Unfortunately, there is a significant difference between economic dependence and
economic reality. Many low-wage laborers have little bargaining power but are not
particularly dependent on one employer precisely because they must often go from one
employer to another just to find work.87 Contingent workers and others on the fringes of
the labor market are often particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation, yet they
would not be covered under the economic realities test because they are not dependent on
any one employer either.88 Conversely, a highly skilled independent contractor could be
See, e.g., Baker v. Flint Eng'g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1443 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (“For example, a
low-skilled worker who regularly shifts jobs (e.g., fast food jobs) would never be dependent upon a single
employer, or even a single industry, for annual subsistence. The worker would necessarily be classified as
an independent contractor for purposes of the FLSA and would not be entitled to overtime pay.”)
88
See, e.g., Befort, supra note 11.
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very dependent on one employer, and an employer can come to depend significantly on a
worker.89 A supplier of a specialized part for a large manufacturer, for instance, could
become economically dependent on the manufacturer if the orders are so large that he has
no time or capacity for any other clients. And the manufacturer could become dependent
on the supplier if there are no other substitutes immediately available. In fact, economists
argue that the very purpose of integrating into a firm, i.e., to turn an independent
contractor relationship into an employment relationship, is to eliminate the economic
dependence of the employer on the supplier.90
More importantly, the economic realities test does not really capture economic
dependence nor economic reality. In practice, the economic realities test does not operate
much differently from the control test.91 The economic realities test is almost always
formalized into discrete factors for analysis. But both the control and economic realities
tests tend to share similar factors for analysis. Of the six factors to be examined within
the economic realities test used by federal courts, for instance, at least five of them are
also considered within the thirteen-factor control test used by the federal courts as well.92
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See supra note 13.
Because economic relationships often require making an investment that is specific to the relationship, a
worker can hold up the employer for more money once the relationship-specific investment has been made.
For instance, a supplier could obtain the reliance of a large manufacturing company by undercutting
competitors and then demand more money from the manufacturer at some time later once it has developed
much of its manufacturing processes around the supplier. Employing the supplier as a part of the
manufacturing company, i.e., to hire her as an employee, on the other hand, eliminates the risk of being
held up in this way. See, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975). See also
Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 82 for the six factors of the economic realities test and supra note 59 for the thirteen
factors of the control test. The only factor within the economic realities test arguably not covered by the
control test refers to the employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial skill. The
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Furthermore, reducing the test into discrete factors has often lead to courts conducting a
factor analysis without examining the facts comprehensively, thus neglecting the very
point of the economic realities test, which is to look beyond formal elements of
employment to capture the underlying economic relationship for each particular case.93
Lastly, insofar as the economic realities test is a formal factor test, most courts continue
to look to the element of managerial control as an important – and often the first – factor
to be considered.94 Given the traditional importance of the control test, inclusion of the
control element can often influence courts to focus on it rather than on the broad
economic dependence of the worker.95
In general, there is a tension that is inherent within a legal test that asks judges to
look beyond formalistic elements and, instead, look to some underlying economic reality
of the relationship without any further guidance. On one hand, formalism can undermine
the expansive aim of the economic realities test, as noted above. On the other hand, a test
that asks courts to conduct a case-by-case analysis of the economic relationship without

lack of overlap is arguable because the skill required for the job is one of the thirteen factors of the control
test.
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See, e.g., Linder, supra note 11, at 208 (“Instead of becoming the centerpiece of purpose-driven
interpretation under the FLSA, this ‘economic reality of dependence’ test has itself degenerated into a
disembodied laundry list of factors. Judges, regardless of whether they wish to include or exclude the
workers in question, unimaginatively check off these factors without embedding the test in the act's
purpose”) (footnotes omitted). See also Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529,
1543 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“We should abandon these unfocused ‘factors’ and start
again.”).
94
See, e.g., supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. See also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d
338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008) (“To aid us in this inquiry, we consider five non-exhaustive factors: (1) the degree
of control exercised by the alleged employer”).
95
See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 11, at 110 (“The court's elevation of the control factor to a position of critical
importance, however, suggests that this analysis easily could be oversimplified to an examination of this
factor alone, thus overshadowing the court's effort to suggest a broader framework of analysis.”).
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any reliance on formal guidance risks increasing the levels of unpredictability and
variation across jurisdictions. Both the control and the economic realities tests are
already bloated with too many factors, and they have led to significant uncertainty over
how a judge will actually adjudicate a particular case.96 If a test for employee status is to
strike the balance between economic reality and formal guidance, it must rely on simple
criteria that reflect the actual economic reality of employee relationships.
C) The emergence of the entrepreneurial opportunities test
One recent response to the limitations of the control and economic realities tests
discussed above has been an increased focus on entrepreneurship as a litmus test for
employee status. To be sure, courts have looked to entrepreneurship as a guidepost for
employee classification for as long as there has been a need for employee classification.97
But these cases almost always understood the entrepreneurial element as a proxy for
employer control. For instance, The Restatement of Employment Law interprets the
element of employer control as important to distinguish employees from independent
contractors because it precludes the worker from being able to exercise entrepreneurial
control to further her interests.98 Under this formulation, entrepreneurial control pertains
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See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Indian Ref. Co., 280 Ky. 811, 134 S.W.2d 620, 624 (1939) (noting that the lack of
employer control over the worker indicated that he was “to all intents and purposes an entrepreneur”);
N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few problems in the law have given greater
variety of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly
an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.”).
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RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt d (“the employer's power to control the manner and
means by which an individual renders services is sufficient to make the service provider an employee.
Where the employer exercises such power, the service provider generally cannot further his or her
economic interest by exercising entrepreneurial authority”).
97
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to the typical employer’s control over his business, “including whether to hire and where
to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where to deploy equipment, and whether
and when to provide service to other customers.”99 As a result, much of the attention to
entrepreneurship had, until recently, been on the element of employer control and the
ways in which it impacted workers.100
However, a recent line of employee classification cases within the D.C. Circuit
has resulted in what has come to be known as the entrepreneurial opportunities test.
Under this inquiry, the focus is placed on whether or not the worker has an
entrepreneurial opportunity to profit. An entrepreneurial opportunity refers to a worker’s
“opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just harder” by taking on economic
risk.101 An opportunity arises from a realistic right to exercise discretion for potential
profit, and the actual exercise of the right is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether the
opportunity exists.102 Thus, the D.C. circuit found that delivery drivers for FedEx Home
Delivery were independent contractors “by evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity”
because they possessed the contractual right to hire drivers for their routes and sell their
routes, despite the fact that only a few drivers actually ever did so.103 On the other hand,
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RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01(b).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 Reporters’ Notes (“The requirement that the
employment relationship effectively prevent the employee from rendering services as part of an
independent business ties the entrepreneurial-control test to the right-to-control test.”).
101
Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780.
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FedEx Home Delivery, at 502 (noting that “the failure to take advantage of an opportunity is beside the
point.”). See also C.C. E., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 60 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Likewise it is the worker's
retention of the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity rather than his regular exercise of that right that is
most relevant for the purpose of determining whether he is an independent contractor.”).
103
FedEx Home Delivery, at 504. Of the 36 drivers working for the two terminals in FedEx Home
Delivery, only three drivers had multiple routes, and there have ever been two sales of routes. See FedEx
Home Delivery, Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, 2008 WL 4425831 (C.A.D.C.), at 6 and 21.
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the court ruled that drivers in a different context “lacked all entrepreneurial opportunity”
and were thus employees because, although they owned their vehicles, they were not
permitted to hire other drivers or use their vehicles for others jobs.104
On its face, the entrepreneurial opportunities test is a “subtle refinement” of the
traditional control test rooted in the common law of agency.105 Under the test, “all the
considerations at common law remain in play,” and it is only “in cases where some
factors cut one way and some the other” that entrepreneurial opportunities provide “an
important animating principle by which to evaluate those factors.”106 However, since
almost all cases will involve some factors cutting one way and some the other, the
entrepreneurial opportunities test effectively constitutes a significant departure from the
control test rather than a mere refinement. Previous explicit inclusions of the element of
entrepreneurship in the control test, to the extent that it was included at all, was as one
among many factors to interpret the facts in light of the test’s overall emphasis on
employer control.107 On the other hand, the entrepreneurial opportunities test treats the
element of entrepreneurship as the primary theoretical lens itself through which courts
should interpret all of the common law factors.108 In other words, the entrepreneurial
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Corporate Express Delivery Systems, at 780-781.
FedEx Home Delivery, at 497.
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See, e.g., Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 580 F.2d 966, 972–73 (9th Cir. 1978) (“In
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, the Board and the courts apply general
agency principles…. Other factors which this court has considered are the entrepreneurial aspects of the
individual's business”). See also N.L.R.B. v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912, 919–20 (11th
Cir. 1983) (“Stated somewhat differently, whether agents are employees or independent contractors
requires application of a control test which takes into account the degree of supervision, the entrepreneurial
interests of the agent and any other relevant factors.”).
108
See, e.g., Judge Garland’s dissent in FedEx Home Delivery, at 508-509 (J. Garland dissenting) (“My
colleagues cite only one case from this (or any) Circuit, our 2002 opinion in Corporate Express, for the
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opportunities test effectively abandons control as the primary focus of the test for
employee status and looks to the element of entrepreneurship as a replacement for
control.109
Yet, despite this recent interest in entrepreneurship, there has been very little
discussion about what entrepreneurship is and why it ought to matter for employee status.
The D.C. Circuit seems to understand entrepreneurship as economic risk taking, where
the entrepreneur assumes both the potential profits and losses associated with running a
business.110 But risk taking cannot be the sole defining characteristic of an entrepreneur
because all economic activity involves risk. All investors take economic risk and stand to
profit or suffer losses from their investment, but to call every person who makes
investments for a living an entrepreneur would dilute the term into uselessness. Even
more importantly, virtually all workers take economic risks regularly. A worker takes a
risk when making a bold proposal to his employer. He stands to gain from his actions in
the way of a promotion and/or a raise if his proposal is a good one, and he will suffer
losses in the form of a pay cut or company discipline if his proposal turns out to be a dud.
Since the very question the courts must answer is whether a worker is an employee or an

proposition that entrepreneurial opportunity has… become the emphasis of the independent contractor
test…. I do not dispute that theirs is one fair reading of that opinion…. But Corporate Express did not
purport to overrule Supreme Court, Circuit, and Board precedent…. Corporate Express can also be read as
merely holding that the Board was reasonable in determining that entrepreneurial opportunity tipped the
balance in that case…. There was certainly nothing in the NLRB's opinion in Corporate Express to suggest
that entrepreneurial opportunity had become the focus of the Board's own analysis. To the contrary, the
Board simply followed its traditional approach of examining the common-law factors.”).
109
See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery, at 497 (“In other words, ‘control’ was close to what we were trying to
capture, but it wasn't a perfect concurrence. It was as if the sheet music just didn't quite match the tune.”).
110
See, e.g., supra note 25.
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independent contractor, how is the court to distinguish whether an economic risk involves
profits and losses or raises and pay cuts? Without more elaboration on what kind of
economic risk counts and why, the simple evocation of economic risk taking cannot
distinguish independent contractors from employees.
What is needed, then, is an examination of the concept of entrepreneurship itself
along with what, if anything, can be gained from its use in employee classification.
Luckily, there is a century’s worth of material that examines the concept of
entrepreneurship. The next section will draw on these theories of entrepreneurship to
sharpen the understanding of what constitutes entrepreneurship. Once the concept of
entrepreneurship is clarified, we will be in a better position to assess its usefulness for
employee classification.
III. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
This section links together three classic economic theories of entrepreneurship to
show their potential for informing legal tests for employee status. The overarching
framework is provided by Frank Knight’s theory that entrepreneurship refers to a
specialized economic function that bears entrepreneurial responsibility, which refers to
the entrepreneur’s ultimate responsibility for a business enterprise in light of economic
uncertainty. Unlike other types of risk, economic uncertainty refers to the risks
associated with future supply and demand in the market, which is not knowable in any
probable sense. In a world full of uncertainty, the entrepreneur is someone who
possesses superior confidence and/or knowledge about market conditions and exposes
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himself to potential losses in the market so that he may be in a position to realize a pure
profit from his risk-taking.
From this overall view of the entrepreneur, three insights can be gleaned from the
economic theories of entrepreneurship provided by Knight, Joseph Schumpeter, and
Israel Kirzner. First, an important insight from Knight’s account of economic uncertainty
is that the entrepreneur provides a guarantee to others for potential losses associated with
the business enterprise. Whereas laborers and investors forgo the opportunity to earn a
pure profit by accepting a fixed wage and a market-determined return on investment,
respectively, entrepreneurs expose themselves to potential losses in pursuit of profit.
Second, Schumpeter’s account of the entrepreneur emphasizes the control element of
assuming entrepreneurial responsibility. The entrepreneur within the Schumpeterian
account disrupts the status quo by carrying on new combinations of resources. And
because control over resources is necessary to combine them in new ways, the
Schumpeterian entrepreneur must exercise control over the allocation of resources being
combined to sell in the market. Third, Kirzner argues that entrepreneurs bring the market
closer to equilibrium by discovering and exploiting potential opportunities for arbitrage.
Within this view, the entrepreneurial function consists of exposing a previously unnoticed
potential for a more efficient allocation of resources by buying resources to sell in the
market in the pursuit of profits.
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A) Knight and uncertainty
Despite the importance of and frequent references to the entrepreneur in
economics and economic history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there were no
notable contributions in economic theory about the entrepreneur until Frank Knight and
Joseph Schumpeter in the early 20th Century.111 Knight’s work on the entrepreneur was
concerned primarily with what he calls “the problem of profit.”112 Economic theory
postulates that competition should have the tendency to bring the allocation of resources
to an equilibrium, i.e., a condition where the value of resources is equal to their cost, and
thus bring profits to zero. Nevertheless, Knight recognized that profit never disappeared
in real life. Why do entrepreneurs continue to profit from their activity when economic
theory postulates that they should not?
One important aspect of the problem of profit is how it is defined.113 Profit is
often used to describe the residual between the total revenues and costs of a business.
This, however, is accounting profit, and its existence does not necessarily pose a problem
for economists because it can encompass not only profit but also the entrepreneur’s
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wages and the return on the entrepreneur’s capital investment. An entrepreneur’s wage is
the rate of compensation set ex ante by the market for the cost of the entrepreneur’s
services. The return on capital investment is the cost of capital that is set by the market.
For instance, suppose that you made a $1,000,000 investment in your own business last
year. In the past year, the total revenues for your business reached $2,000,000, you paid
$1,800,000 in expenses, and the depreciation on your assets were $100,000. In such a
scenario, you would have realized $100,000 in accounting profit. However, the $100,000
that is left over to you is commingled with your own wages and return on capital.
Suppose that, when you started your business, the expected rate of return for a
$1,000,000 investment was $50,000. Suppose further that the yearly salary for someone
with your skillset was $80,000 when you started your business. In such an instance, by
running your own business, you lost $30,000 since you could have earned $130,000 by
investing your money elsewhere and working for someone else. The problem of profit
arises from the existence of pure profit, which is a portion of accounting profit that
cannot be attributed to the entrepreneur’s wages or return on capital. For instance, if the
total revenues of your business reached $2,500,000 rather than $2,000,000, your
accounting profit would have been $600,000, with $470,000 in pure profits. The problem
of profit, then, is explaining why the market allows for the extra $470,000 because the
margin implies an inefficiency in the market for allocating capital and/or labor. Why are
workers and/or investors unable to demand higher compensation until pure profits reach
zero if there is competition among entrepreneurs for labor and/or capital?
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Knight’s answer to the problem of profit was that competition in the real market is
imperfect due to a limitation of human knowledge stemming from economic
uncertainty.114 Economic uncertainty refers to a special type of risk in the market.
Normal risk follows a known distribution of potential outcomes and thus can be insured
against. The risk of a fire in one’s warehouse, for instance, is a normal risk, and the
compensation that an insurance company receives from taking on the risk of a warehouse
fire consists of a return on the capital it has available to pay out claims for warehouse
fires and is not a form of pure profit. Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to risks
associated with circumstances for which there is no known distribution of potential
outcomes. Economic uncertainty refers to the risks associated with the need to plan ex
ante for a production process aimed to satisfy future demand in the market.115 Knight
argued that a market devoid of economic uncertainty would result in no pure profit since
the probable losses associated with anticipating future supply and demand could be
quantified into known fixed costs that others can use to bring the costs of the
entrepreneur’s wages and investment into equilibrium with the rest of the market. Under
uncertainty, however, there can be no known cost of anticipating future supply and
demand in the market. As a result, the market cannot accurately price the wages and

114

See, generally, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT. For a detailed discussion of risk and uncertainty, see
Chapters VII and VIII.
115
Id., at 237-238 (“At the bottom of the uncertainty problem in economics is the forward-looking
character of the economic process itself. Goods are produced to satisfy wants; the production of goods
requires time, and two elements of uncertainty are introduced, corresponding to two different kinds of
foresight which must be exercised…. The producer, then, must estimate (1) the future demand which he is
striving to satisfy and (2) the future results of his operations in attempting to satisfy that demand.”).

71
investment of the entrepreneur,116 and the entrepreneur has a chance to earn pure profit
by taking on the responsibility of anticipating future supply and demand.
Under Knight’s theory, the entrepreneur is someone who attempts to earn a pure
profit by assuming the responsibility for economic uncertainty. If the markets were
absent of uncertainty, even workers who help to anticipate future supply and demand by
allocating capital and labor would only be considered laborers – and not entrepreneurs –
since they would only be earning a wage for their work. The existence of economic
uncertainty, however, makes unknowable what will be the efficient allocation of
resources for future consumption. Under such conditions, there will be some who, for
reasons of superior knowledge, judgment, and/or confidence, are willing to assume the
responsibility of forecasting future demand in the pursuit of pure profit. The resulting
arrangement will be a “system under which the confident and venturesome ‘assume the
risk’ or ‘insure’ the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the latter a specified income in
return for an assignment of the actual results.”117 Those in the former group, according to
Knight, are known as entrepreneurs, and they assume the responsibility for confronting
economic uncertainty by guaranteeing others a specified return for their investment or
effort. And by providing such a guarantee, the entrepreneur stands to gain pure profits
when market conditions are more favorable than anticipated and to suffer financial losses
when market conditions are less favorable than anticipated.

Id., at 284 (noting that pure profit is “a margin of error in calculation on the part of the nonentrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not force the successful entrepreneurs to pay as much for
productive services as they could be forced to pay.”).
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Id., at 269-270.
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B) Schumpeter and creative destruction
While Knight was examining the entrepreneur through the lens of uncertainty and
profit, Joseph Schumpeter was concurrently examining the entrepreneur as part of his
inquiry into economic development.118 If the market process consists of reaching an
equilibrium of efficient resource allocation, how and why does the economy undergo
development and change?119 Schumpeter criticized existing economic theory as static
and only capable of analyzing what he called the circular flow of economic life.120
Within the circular flow, the market adjusts to new information and tends to bring
resource allocation to an equilibrium. What static theories do not capture, though, is the
element of dynamism within economic development. Economic development consists of
a disruption to the existing circular flow by the adjustment of the very channels of the
circular flow itself. When cars change lanes to adjust to an accident on a highway, for
instance, they are adjusting to changes in information within the circular flow of traffic.
Similarly, the circular flow in the economy adjusts to changing conditions of supply and
demand. Economic development, on the other hand, is akin to a change in the highway
itself, and it proceeds by what Schumpeter famously described later as an ongoing
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process of creative destruction, where the existing circular flow is disrupted and then
replaced with a new circular flow.121
For Schumpeter, the central player within economic development is the
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur’s unique role within the process of economic
development is to disrupt the existing circular flow and replace it with a new one by the
carrying out of new combinations of resources.122 All economic production, according to
Schumpeter, consists of combining resources,123 and the carrying out of new
combinations can consist of a variety of activities, including the introduction of goods or
methods, the exploitation of new resources, or creating/organizing a market or an
industry.124 By innovatively carrying out new combinations, the entrepreneur drives
economic development through a process of creative destruction. Thus, Schumpeter’s
definition of the entrepreneur is functional. An entrepreneur is defined not by who a
person is but by what a person does, and the mere possession of a right or the opportunity
to carry out new combination does not make one an entrepreneur.125 Furthermore, the
See, e.g., CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY at 83 (“The opening up of new markets, foreign or
domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate
the same process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes
the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one.
This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism”).
122
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doing of new things or the doing of things that are already being done in a new way”). But since all
economic production consists of carrying out combinations, the entrepreneur, at least within the context of
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entrepreneurial function is contextual. An action is entrepreneurial only as part of the
overall context of economic development. The same action that was entrepreneurial at
the onset of the process of creative destruction can cease to be entrepreneurial once a new
circular flow is established. Lastly, entrepreneurship is often commingled with other
economic functions in real life. When one starts one’s own business, for instance, he
often acts not only as an entrepreneur but also as a manager, an investor, and an inventor.
Nevertheless, the entrepreneurial function is distinct from all of these other roles and
should be considered separately from them.126
Upon first glance, Schumpeter seems to disagree with Knight on what makes
someone an entrepreneur. Knight’s entrepreneur is responsible for economic uncertainty,
and many interpreters of Knight assume that responsibility for economic uncertainty must
come in the form of ownership.127 The entrepreneur, according to this view, is one who
owns the means of production and stands exposed to potential gains and losses associated
with their investment. On the other hand, Schumpeter argued that the entrepreneurial
function of carrying out new combinations did not need ownership of the means of
production at all. All that was needed was control.128 Only by exercising his command

exchange economy who are usually so designated, but all who actually fulfil the function by which we
define the concept… [and] narrower than the traditional one in that it does not include all heads of firms or
managers or industrialists who merely may operate an established business, but only those who actually
perform that function.”). See also id, at 78 (“everyone is an entrepreneur only when he actually 'carries out
new combinations,' and loses that character as soon as he has built up his business, when he settles down to
running it as other people run their businesses.”).
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over productive resources can the entrepreneur take them out of their current use within
the circular flow – or take them out of their non-use – and re-allocate them for new
combination. Furthermore, Schumpeter argued that financiers, not entrepreneurs, bear
the risks associated with entrepreneurship and that although the capitalist and
entrepreneur functions are usually commingled in real life, they are distinct and can be
separated.129 What some interpreters assume, then, is that Knight’s entrepreneur is a
capitalist whereas Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is someone who borrows credit from the
capitalist to carry out new combinations.
However, these differences are superficial, and Knight and Schumpeter do not
fundamentally disagree. Once one recognizes that Schumpeter uses the term ‘risk’ in
different ways and that Knight’s conception of responsibility encompasses more than
capital investment, it becomes easy to reconcile both views as emphasizing different
aspects of the same economic function. First, Schumpeter uses the term risk to refer both
to normal risk and economic uncertainty. Like Knight, Schumpeter argues that profit is
distinct from wages and return on capital and that an entrepreneur is someone who earns
a profit.130 Furthermore, he argues that whereas income for assuming risk entails a return
on capital rather than profit, profit and loss do have their source in risks when they are
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“not foreseen or at any rate are not taken account of in the economic plan.”131 When he
refers to financiers as bearers of risk, then, he has in mind someone who earns an income
from her capital by assuming responsibility for a risk that is different from the kind of
risk that leads to profits. In other words, he views the capitalist function as bearing
normal risk and the entrepreneur as being responsible for economic uncertainty. Second,
Knight does not argue that responsibility requires capital investment. He is clear that
although the vast majority of entrepreneurship entails at least a partial investment of
capital, it is possible “[i]n some instances, though perhaps a relatively small proportion of
real enterprises and those probably of small average size, [that] the independent
entrepreneur may have no property investment in his business, furnishing labor services
only.”132 Furthermore, Knight argues that “the rare and improbable case of a man who
owns nothing in a particular business and contributes nothing to it but responsibility” is
nevertheless an instance of a “pure form” of entrepreneurship.133 What matters is
assuming entrepreneurial responsibility. Of course, the entrepreneur in this case still
stands to suffer a financial loss from his activity since he will need to borrow the
resources necessary to conduct his business and will need to repay to the extent that he is
able to do so.134 But so does the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. What matters for Knight is
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that the entrepreneur expose himself to potential loss, and what matters for Schumpeter is
that the entrepreneur carry out new combinations. Both of these elements are
complementary and can be subsumed under Knight’s broad conception of entrepreneurial
responsibility.
C) Kirzner and alertness
As was the case with Knight and Schumpeter, Israel Kirzner’s examination of the
entrepreneur was also grounded in a critique of existing economic theory about markets,
prices, and equilibrium. For Kirzner, existing economic theories placed too much
importance on the conditions for equilibrium.135 Existing notions of perfect competition
and general equilibrium rely on the assumption of perfect information. But since
knowledge and competition are imperfect in the real world, economics must supply an
account of how the market “supplies new information to the participants.”136 Kirzner
provides such an account by highlighting what he calls the market process. Rather than
understanding the market as a place where economic exchanges take place, Kirzner
argues that the market is a process that consists of “a series of systematic changes in the
interconnected network of market decisions… generated by the flow of market
information released by market participation.”137 As economic actors participate in the

infra Section IV.D for a discussion on such a diffusion leading to the conclusion that there is often no
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market process, they scan and process existing information in an attempt to bid or offer
better opportunities than their competitors. The discovery and exploitation of such
opportunities drives the market process and helps to bring it closer to the theoretical
equilibrium.
For Kirzner, entrepreneurship is an economic function that plays a central role in
driving the market process. Entrepreneurs help to bring the market closer to equilibrium
by discovering new opportunities for arbitrage in the market. An opportunity exists when
market participants are ignorant of the fact that sellers are willing to sell for less and/or
buyers are willing to buy for more than the existing price.138 Entrepreneurs exploit such
opportunities by discovering buyers to whom they can sell for slightly more than the
existing price and/or sellers from whom they can buy for slightly less than the existing
price.139 Thus, unlike standard economic actors who maximize their preferences while
taking the price and/or output data as a given, entrepreneurs act on their discovered
opportunities to change the price and/or output data to profit from them.140 And in the
process of changing price and/or output data, entrepreneurs help to bring the market
closer to equilibrium by exposing the previous ignorance among market participants of
opportunities to allocate resources more efficiently.
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Key to the ability to discover previously unrecognized opportunities for market
arbitrage is the element of entrepreneurial alertness. Entrepreneurial alertness refers to
“an attitude of receptiveness to available (but hitherto overlooked) opportunities.”141
Alertness is similar to – yet ultimately different from – knowledge. Rather than
knowledge of market information, alertness refers to the knowledge of where to look for
knowledge.142 Knowledge of market information is a resource and can be purchased in
the factor market. For instance, if I would like to set up a fast food franchise in St. Louis,
I can hire someone who is knowledgeable about the industry and the specific location that
I am considering. If the knowledge about the Saint Louis fast food market were the key
aspect of knowledge required for entrepreneurship, the person I would hire could be the
entrepreneur herself rather than work for me. According to Kirzner, assuming that the
opportunity for profit truly exists, the fact that the knowledgeable worker would be
willing to work for me rather than pursue the opportunity for entrepreneurial profit for
herself shows that she lacks the alertness to the opportunity for market arbitrage, even if
she possesses deep knowledge of the market.143 Because I am the one who recognizes
the opportunity for profit and exploits it by hiring someone who does not recognize it, the
ultimate knowledge of market conditions, at least in the sense that matters for bringing
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the market closer to equilibrium, resides with me and my alertness to the opportunity. In
other words, entrepreneurial alertness refers to not knowledge of market conditions itself
but rather a higher-order knowledge that can recognize market opportunities and exploit
them by obtaining the appropriate resources to do so.
Kirzner’s account of the entrepreneur has generated considerable debate as to
whether he agrees or disagrees with Schumpeter. One interpretation of Kirzner argues
that he offers a competing perspective to Schumpeter’s view.144 Whereas the
Schumpeterian entrepreneur disrupts the market out of equilibrium, the thinking goes, the
Kirznerian entrepreneur brings the market to equilibrium. However, these contrasts
between Kirzner and Schumpeter are overblown. Even in his early work, Kirzner saw his
account of the entrepreneur to describe the same economic actor as Schumpeter with only
a different emphasis in relation to the entrepreneur’s impact on economic equilibrium.145
Later on, Kirzner explicitly subsumed the Schumpeterian entrepreneur within his model
by arguing that the creative destruction unleashed by the entrepreneur is a response to an
opportunity for arbitrage that entrepreneurial alertness discovers.146 As a result most
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modern scholars view the Kirznerian and Schumpeterian accounts of the entrepreneur as
complementary or even identical.147
In addition to Schumpeter, Kirzner also saw a great deal of consistency between
Knight’s account of the entrepreneur and his own.148 In his earlier work, Kirzner argues
that Knight’s focus on economic uncertainty masks the extent to which the entrepreneur
discovers an actual opportunity that exists, regardless of the uncertainty associated with
it.149 In other words, Kirzner and Knight disagree on the ontology of entrepreneurial
opportunity. Whereas the Knightian opportunity is uncertain and something to be
grasped only ex post, the Kirznerian opportunity is real and can be discovered with
certainty ex ante. Nevertheless, even early on, Kirzner agreed with almost everything
else that Knight observed about the entrepreneur. For instance, Kirzner writes that “his
identification of where entrepreneurship is located is superb”150 and that Knight’s
conception of responsibility for economic uncertainty “is immediately identifiable with
[his] own notion of ‘ultimate knowledge’ – that is, with entrepreneurial alertness.”151
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And in his later work, Kirzner explicitly saw himself as working from within the tradition
started by Knight that emphasizes the central importance of economic uncertainty in
entrepreneurship.152
Thus, although the three classic theories of Knight, Schumpeter, and Knight seem
to identify different aspects of entrepreneurship as a central defining characteristic, many
entrepreneurship scholars now see them as merely emphasizing different aspects of the
same entrepreneurial process. Overall, many see Schumpeter and Kirzner’s theories as
providing complementary views that elaborate on Knight’s fundamental assertion that
entrepreneurs assume the risks associated with economic uncertainty.153 As will be seen
in the next section, the entrepreneurial responsibilities test follows the same line of
interpretation and looks to the three different accounts of entrepreneurship provided by
Knight, Schumpeter, and Kirzner as giving an account of the same phenomenon of
entrepreneurship, with three different emphases. Furthermore, it will look to the
Knightian emphasis on the entrepreneur’s assumption of entrepreneurial responsibility as
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the lens through which courts should assess the extent to which workers act in ways that
correspond to the three different points of emphasis.
IV. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TEST
The entrepreneurial responsibilities test draws from the classic theories of
entrepreneurship discussed above to define the entrepreneur as someone who assumes
entrepreneurial responsibility. It can be seen as a modification of the entrepreneurial
opportunities test in that it considers whether or not a worker is an independent contractor
by looking to whether she is an entrepreneur. Like all tests for employee status discussed
above and for reasons that will be discussed in the next section, the entrepreneurial
responsibilities test also operates within the binary dichotomy between independent
contractors and employees. Thus, under the proposed test, courts should look to the
worker’s assumption of entrepreneurial responsibility for her work to determine whether
she is working as an entrepreneur. And unless the court determines that the worker is
working as an entrepreneur, she should be considered an employee.
But what does it mean for workers to assume entrepreneurial responsibility? The
entrepreneurial responsibilities test draws on economic theories of entrepreneurship to
provide three elements that workers must meet to be considered an entrepreneur. The
first element is the Knightian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker assumes
liability for economic uncertainty in the pursuit of profit. The second element is the
Schumpeterian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker exercises control over
the allocation of resources being combined to sell in the market. The third element is the
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Kirznerian element, and it looks to whether or not the worker participates in the market
discovery process by buying resources to sell in the market in the pursuit of profit. The
entrepreneurial responsibilities test classifies a worker as an employee unless her work
responsibilities satisfy all three elements of the test.
A) Assumption of liability for economic uncertainty
The first element of the entrepreneurial responsibilities test draws from Knight’s
theory of entrepreneurship and considers whether or not the worker assumes liability for
economic uncertainty in the pursuit of profit. As noted above, the Knightian entrepreneur
provides a guarantee to other workers for the economic uncertainty associated with the
business enterprise by assuming liability for potential financial losses.154 However, the
assumption of liability in the entrepreneurial sense is different from the assumption of
liability in general. An indemnification agreement that only shifts tort liability to the
employer, for instance, has no bearing on the entrepreneurial responsibilities test because
the assumed risk pertains to harms caused to others. Such risk is merely normal risk, and
it can be insured against. Economic uncertainty, on the other hand, pertains to the risks
associated with market conditions. The only type of risk that the entrepreneurial function
assumes is that of economic uncertainty, i.e., the risk that accompanies forecasting future
supply or demand in the market.
The assumption of liability for economic uncertainty will typically involve
ownership of the means of production involved within the enterprise. When a worker
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makes a capital investment in resources required for the job, she assumes some
responsibility for economic uncertainty associated with the investment. If I purchase a
car to use as a driver for Uber, for instance, I may find myself with a potential loss if
automation significantly reduces the demand for Uber drivers in the near future. Thus,
existing tests do capture some entrepreneurial element to the extent that they look to the
ownership of or investment in tools and materials required for the work.155
However, as discussed above,156 ownership of the means of production is not
necessary to assume liability for economic uncertainty. Imagine, for instance, a car
dealer who sells delivery trucks to several different drivers but grants the buyers an
option to sell the trucks back to him at a set price. In such a scenario, the fact that the
drivers own the trucks would not have any bearing on whether or not they assume
entrepreneurial responsibility because their purchase would not assume any liability for
economic uncertainty. It is the car dealer who provides the ultimate guarantee for
potential downturns in market conditions, and he should be considered the entrepreneur
within the overall enterprise. To the extent that there are pure profits to be made from
this enterprise, they would accrue to the car dealer in the form of a premium he charges
the drivers for the option. Any profits that drivers earn would be a form of wages for
their labor and/or a return on their investment in the cars, not pure profit.
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Lastly, the assumption of liability for economic uncertainty must be connected
with an entrepreneurial pursuit of profit. Mere exposure to potential loss for a financial
decision made for reasons other than the pursuit of pure profit does not qualify one as an
entrepreneur. Imagine, for instance, a homeowner who begins to rent out her spare
bedroom on AirBnB after having owned her home for forty years. Although she owns
the most critical resource needed for operating her enterprise, it cannot be said that her
actions entail assuming liability for economic uncertainty because her investment in the
home was not made in pursuit of profits related to a forecasted future demand for AirBnB
rentals. Of course, most financial decisions are made with multiple motivations, so the
extent to which the entrepreneurial element is present in a worker’s situation will depend
on the extent to which the worker stands exposed to potential loss associated with her
pursuit of profit. Thus, investments in education will help determine independent
contractor status only to the extent that the investment was made for profit-seeking
reasons. The employer of an enterprising individual who obtains a student loan to attend
plumbing school should be able to argue that the worker should be classified as an
independent contractor, whereas an employer of an individual with student loans from
her liberal arts college degree should have a difficult case to make. Of course, if the
employer offers any tuition assistance for continuing education, it is the employer and not
the worker who assumes liability for the economic uncertainty associated with the
investment in human capital.
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B) Allocative control over resource combination
The second element draws from Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship and
considers whether or not the worker exercises control over the allocation of resources
being combined to sell in the market. Allocative control of resource combination differs
from the traditional indicators of control within tests for employee status in a variety of
ways. First, the allocative control factor looks at the worker’s relationship to the
resources required for the business. Thus, the controlling person is the worker, whereas
the traditional control and the economic realities tests attempt to determine whether or
not the employer exercises control over the work and/or the worker.157 Second, the
allocative control element looks at control over the allocation of resources for the
carrying on of new combinations. Thus, what is crucial is whether or not the worker
exercises control over the allocation of resources being combined for sale in the market
and not just the resources themselves. Also, since the control must be exercised over the
allocation of resources, it is not enough that a worker exercises control over just some of
the resources. Instead, the worker must be able to control the allocation of the entire
range of resources that are being combined. Third, the allocative control element looks
to whether or not the worker actually exercises control over the combination of resources.
The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is defined by her actions rather than her rights.158 The
right of control does not turn a worker into an entrepreneur unless it is exercised to carry

The control test looks to the employer’s control over the worker by examining a variety of factors,
including whether the employer has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party. See supra note
59. The economic realities test also considers the employer’s control of a worker’s duties or the manner of
performance. See supra notes 81 and 82.
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out new combinations. Thus, an owner of an enterprise who might have the right to
control the allocation and combination of resources within the business will still not be
acting as an entrepreneur as if she defers to an employee to control her enterprise.
Within a corporate environment, it will typically be the case that a key signpost
for whether or not the worker exercises allocative control will be the exercise of
managerial responsibility over the enterprise. For instance, the manager of a factory acts
as an entrepreneur when she exercises control over how resources are to be allocated and
how materials and labor are to be combined for assembly. On the other hand, if the
manager of the factory defers to the foreman’s judgment about allocation and
combination, it would be the foreman rather than the manager who would be acting as an
entrepreneur within the enterprise. Nevertheless, it would be nearly impossible for a line
worker within the factory to exercise allocative control since entrepreneurial control
within a factory pertains to control over the allocation of the entire range of resources that
are being combined within the factory.
As is implied with the factory example above, whether or not the worker exercises
allocative control will depend significantly on how one defines the level at which the
resource combination is being carried out. Imagine, for instance, that a farmer delivers
wheat to a bread factory. Whether or not the farmer exercises allocative control over
resource combination will depend on whether or not the relevant level of resource
combination within his work is bread baking or wheat growing. At the bread baking
level, wheat is one among many resources being combined to bake and sell bread, and the

89
farmer has no allocative control over the range of resources being combined. At the
wheat growing level, on the other hand, wheat is the final product being delivered to a
customer, and the farmer has allocative control over land, water, and other resources that
are combined to grow and deliver wheat.
Because the entrepreneur assumes entrepreneurial responsibility by participating
in the market,159 the relevant level of resource combination should be the level at which
the market transaction occurs. The entrepreneurial exercise of allocative control over
resources occurs up until the result of resource combination is sold to a buyer. If a
resource is purchased for use in a new combination, it is the purchaser of the resource
rather than its seller who exercises allocative control over how the purchased resource
will be used. For instance, in the wheat farmer example above, the farmer’s allocative
control over resources occurs until the wheat is sold to the bread factory. Once the
factory purchases wheat, it exercises allocative control over wheat, along with other
resources, to produce bread for sale. On the other hand, if there is no market transaction
for the wheat, it will be the factory rather than the farmer who exercises allocative control
over wheat growing. Thus, if the factory hired the farmer to grow its wheat for them, the
farmer would not be acting as an entrepreneur since the factory is paying for his labor
rather than purchasing the wheat from him. Furthermore, as will be seen with the third
element of the entrepreneurial responsibilities test, the fact that the transaction occurs
within the market context matters quite a bit as well. If the factory enters into an
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exclusive contract with the farmer to purchase wheat from him in such a way that the
farmer could not meaningfully engage in the market to sell his wheat, the farmer would
not be considered an entrepreneur either.
C) Buying to sell for profit
The third element draws from Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship and considers
whether or not the worker buys resources to sell in the market in the pursuit of profits.
As noted above, the Kirznerian entrepreneur is alert to opportunities for bringing the
market closer to equilibrium.160 Market disequilibrium exists when there are
opportunities to allocate resources more efficiently. Since the market comes to an
equilibrium once all resources are allocated to their highest valued use, a market in
disequilibrium contains within it at least some type of an imbalance between supply and
demand. Markets utilize the price mechanism to correct such imbalances. When there
are more potential sellers than buyers, prices should drop, and prices should rise when
there are more potential buyers than sellers. However, the movement in prices is not a
mechanical response to underlying market conditions. Neither do prices adjust magically
on their own. Instead, it is the entrepreneur who recognizes the imbalance and helps to
correct the market by buying from the surplus of sellers for a little less than the market
price to sell to potential buyers at the market price and/or buying from sellers at the
market price to sell to the surplus of buyers for a little more than the market price.
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When examining the buying and selling activities of the worker under the
entrepreneurial responsibilities test, it is important to connect these activities to the
worker’s pursuit of profits. After all, all workers need to buy resources to support their
work in some way, and they often participate in the labor market as sellers of labor. But
whereas normal workers sell their labor to obtain a wage and buy resources to sustain
their capacity to live and work, entrepreneurs look to earn a pure profit by buying to sell.
As noted above, pure profit refers to the remainder of an enterprise that cannot be
attributed to wages or a return on investment.161 By definition, what a worker earns as
compensation for her labor does not constitute a profit. Furthermore, within Kirzner’s
theory, profit arises only when there is a discrepancy between the market price and
underlying market conditions due to the mismatch in supply and demand.162 The
entrepreneur can be identified by his buying resources for the purposes of attempting to
sell them – as they are or as part of a new combination – for a profit. Thus, even if it
were the case that compensation for labor could somehow count as a profit, the typical
worker is not buying resources in an attempt to combine them with her labor for a higher
price. And to the extent that a worker purchases resources to sell in the market, she will
likely be acting as an entrepreneur.
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To illustrate the buying-to-sell-for-profit element, imagine three different
examples. The first example is a worker who uses the TaskRabbit platform to sell his
services for interested buyers. He also optimizes his time by shopping for his own
groceries when he runs an errand for a TaskRabbit customer to pick up the customer’s
groceries. Although this individual is engaged in both buying and selling, he would
likely not be considered an entrepreneur under the entrepreneurial responsibilities test
because he is not buying groceries to sell them or to combine them into a product to sell.
The buying of his own groceries has the purpose of consumption, not sale. Furthermore,
as discussed above, compensation for his sale of labor will result in wages, not profit.
The second example is a manager of a local outpost of a national grocery store chain.
This individual likely purchases goods directly from the national chain. Suppose, for the
sake of the argument, that his purchases also constitute a buy-for-sale activity. Yet, even
if the grocery store manager buys goods from the chain to sell to customers, he would
still likely not be considered an entrepreneur under the entrepreneurial responsibilities
test because the difference between the prices that he pays and the prices that he charges
will not yield him any profits. He does not realize any gains from the buying and selling,
except perhaps a bonus for a job well done. If anyone realizes a profit, it will be the
owner of the grocery store. The third example is the owner-operator of a small,
independent convenience store. The store owner would likely be considered as an
entrepreneur under the entrepreneurial responsibilities test because he purchases goods
from suppliers in an attempt to sell them to his local customers for a profit. His business
operations are likely the result of his recognition that there was a mismatch between
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supply and demand within the particular location he serves. Perhaps he recognized that
there were not enough convenience stores to provide goods to the local population, or
perhaps he felt that he could offer lower prices and/or better products than other stores in
the area. In recognizing the opportunity, he exercised entrepreneurial alertness to the
potential for profit. And he is attempting to exploit the opportunity by setting up shop
where he did.
The example of the grocery store owner above also illustrates the importance of
market engagement within the entrepreneur’s buy-to-sell-for-profit activities. Kirznerian
entrepreneurship requires profit-seeking through engagement with the market process.
The entrepreneur exploits previously undiscovered opportunities for arbitrage in the
market by discovering buyers and sellers,163 and he can only discover buyers and sellers
through a learning process generated by the unfolding experience of market activity. 164
As a result, a worker acts as an entrepreneur only by engaging with the market process as
both a buyer and a seller. For instance, the grocery store manager may engage with the
market on the demand side by selling purchased goods to customers, but he does not
engage with the market with his buying because he is not free to choose another supplier
from whom he wishes to buy his items. Without the freedom to evaluate his purchasing

See, e.g., COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, at 48 (“Pure entrepreneurial profit… comes from
discovering sellers and buyers of something for which the latter will pay more than the former demand.”).
See also id., at 44 (“This absence of coordination will express itself in price differences…. The profit
opportunities represented by such price differences open up a dimension for purely entrepreneurial activity
which… will consist exclusively in buying resources and selling products.”).
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Id., at 36 (“[O]nce we become sensitive to the decision-makers’ alertness to new possibly worthwhile
ends and newly available means, it may be possible to explain the pattern of change in an individual’s
decisions as the outcome of a learning process generated by the unfolding experience of the decisions
themselves.”).
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options, he has no ability to bring the market closer to equilibrium because he has no
ability to change the way the market allocates resources. On the other hand, if the owner
of a small independent grocery store chooses suppliers from whom he will purchase his
inventory, he engages in the market process even if he cannot change the prices at which
he purchases the items. Even if he lacks the ability to negotiate for a discount, he
influences the allocation of resources in the market by choosing his supplier. This
influence will lead to a change in prices in the overall market. Other suppliers, for
instance, may decide to lower prices to compete with the chosen supplier. Or prices for
goods may increase for the grocery store’s owners because his purchases decrease the
supply of goods for others. In the same way, an entrepreneur in a highly-regulated
industry where the government sets prices for goods engages with the market process by
choosing his customers. His discovery of customers and the act of selling, even without
the ability to change prices, nevertheless influences the allocation of goods within the
regulated market and thus influences how the price mechanism responds to his activity.
D) Applying the test
The entrepreneurial responsibilities test can provide guidance for courts even in
controversial and/or new fact patterns that would lead to uncertainty under other tests.
Rather than applying a wide array of factors that can cut a variety of ways, the
entrepreneurial responsibilities test simplifies the inquiry into three discrete elements that
are necessary for a worker to act as an entrepreneur. Under the test, only when a
worker’s responsibilities meet all three elements will the worker be considered an
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entrepreneur. For reasons provided in the next section, the entrepreneurial
responsibilities test also treats all non-entrepreneur workers as employees. Thus, a
worker would be considered an employee under the proposed test unless her work
responsibilities meet all of its three elements.
Take, for instance, fact patterns involving platform companies in the new sharing
economy. The most prominent example of controversial worker classification concerns
Uber and its drivers. In employment law cases, Uber has typically maintained that it is
merely a technology provider that helps to connect drivers working as independent
contractors with customers looking for a ride.165 And under the control, economic
realities, and entrepreneurial opportunities tests, there is considerable uncertainty as to
whether Uber has an employment relationship with its drivers. Under the thirteen-factor
Federal control test, four factors support the existence of an employment relationship, six
factors support Uber’s case, and three factors are unclear.166 Things are even murkier
under the economic realities test. Under the narrower test, two of the four factors are
unclear, with one factor in favor of each side.167 The same goes for the more expansive

See, e.g., O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Uber passes
itself off as merely a technological intermediary between potential riders and potential drivers.”).
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See supra note 59 for the thirteen factors. Driving for Uber requires little skill, makes assistants
superfluous, and is a part of Uber’s regular business as a business. However, drivers are free to choose
where, when, and how long to work, and they often have short and temporary relationships with Uber.
Uber also lacks the ability to assign additional projects to its drivers, takes a percentage of the driver’s
profits rather than paying them wages, and treats drivers as independent contractors. What is unclear
are the other three factors. Uber can control the manner and means of work, but only indirectly.
Although drivers provide their own cars, Uber provides the app, which is an arguable even more valuable
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See supra note 81 and accompanying text for the four-factor economic realities test. Although driving
is an integral part of Uber’s business, Uber does not pay its drivers wages. The extent of Uber’s control
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test, where three factors are unclear, with a mix of factors supporting each side.168 The
same uncertainty extends to the entrepreneurial opportunities test. Although Uber drivers
have an opportunity to earn more or less based on when and how they work, it is not clear
whether this opportunity is the same kind of opportunity possessed by FedEx drivers who
have the right to hire drivers for their routes and even sell their routes.169
Under the entrepreneurial opportunities test, on the other hand, determining the
employee status of Uber drivers is simpler and more predictable. The first element
counts in Uber’s favor. Uber drivers assume at least some liability for economic
uncertainty, since they own or lease their own vehicles and often spend gas and put wear
on their vehicles driving to places where they anticipate can bring them larger fares. The
second element counts against Uber if courts take Uber’s position at face value, i.e., that
it is merely a third party service provider in a transaction between the driver and the
rider.170 As noted above171, the level at which allocative control is exercised occurs at the
level of the transaction, and within the Uber driver context, the relevant transaction
occurs between the rider and the driver. Yet, when the rider purchases driving services
through Uber, the transaction involves not just the ride but also the smooth efficiency
with which the ride is provided, including the driver-rider match, directions over the
route of the ride, the means of payment, etc. It is Uber, not the driver, that controls the
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allocation of various technological resources required to combine the Uber ride
experience into a single product. Although the Uber driver controls, to a certain extent,
his hours and his vehicle, he does not exercise allocative control over much of the
relevant resources that go into selling the Uber ride to the rider.172 Lastly, the third
element definitively counts against Uber. Although Uber drivers engage the market to
purchase a vehicle and other equipment related to their work, they do not engage the
market to sell their services. It is Uber’s app, not the driver, that discovers drivers willing
to sell their services and riders willing to buy their services at prices that Uber sets. Thus,
drivers engage the Uber app rather than the market to sell their services. The market
actor that performs the entrepreneurial function of bringing the market closer to
equilibrium by discovering buyers and sellers, then, is Uber and not the driver.
A comparison of Uber drivers with taxi drivers helps to accentuate the nuanced
economic logic that the entrepreneurial opportunities test can bring to worker
classification. On their face, taxi drivers seem to be performing similar services as Uber
drivers. But outside of those who rely on a dispatcher to find a majority of their
customers, taxi drivers will often be classified as independent contractors under the
entrepreneurial opportunities test. Like Uber drivers, most taxi drivers assume liability
for economic uncertainty by leasing their vehicles along with their medallions. And
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unlike an Uber ride, the transaction for a taxi ride usually consists of not much more than
the combination of the driver’s resources and labor, albeit often strictly regulated
environment. And lastly, the absence of an intermediary interface like Uber requires that
drivers discover buyers of their services on their own. By exercising their alertness to
profit opportunities by making their own judgments about when, where, and for whom to
work based on their anticipation of supply and demand, taxi drivers engage in the market
for ride services and influence the allocation of rides within the market, even if price
regulation prevents them from setting their own prices.
Lastly, as the Uber example shows, most applications of the entrepreneurial
responsibilities test involving firms involving multiple workers will yield what seems like
a counter-intuitive conclusion for some: there is no entrepreneur except the firm itself.
However, the attribution of the entrepreneurial role to the firm rather than to any
individual worker is the natural result of viewing entrepreneurship as an economic
function within the context of the modern economy. All three economic theories
discussed above view the entrepreneur as the embodiment of an economic function rather
than a class or type of individual.173 The identification of the entrepreneur within these
theories is thus a theoretical exercise intended to isolate the entrepreneurial element
within a given action for the purposes of economic analysis.174 The same individual
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carrying on an economic task in the real world will typically be performing several
functions at once, and the entrepreneurial function will also typically be distributed
among a wide group of individuals in a business enterprise.175 When a worker is acting
on her own behalf or as part of a sole-proprietorship, she may reasonably be viewed as
assuming the entrepreneurial function all on her own. Similarly, a high-level executive in
small to medium-sized firms with a significant equity stake and direct managerial
responsibilities over the firm’s resource allocation and buying and selling activities may
also function as an entrepreneur. But as firms increase in size and complexity, its
entrepreneurial function will often be dispersed across a wide range of actors, and the
only entrepreneur available to identify in such instances may be the legal person of the
firm.176
V. JUSTIFYING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TEST
The bifurcation of workers into two main categories – independent contractors
and employees – is widely established in U.S. law and also frequently criticized. Many
scholars have argued that the current framework excludes from legal protection a wide

to treat him as if he represented two entirely separate decision-makers, one a passive economizer, the
other a pure entrepreneur.”).
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Ménard, Hybrid Modes of Organization: Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other Strange Animals, in
ROBERT GIBBONS and JOHN ROBERTS (eds.), THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 1066 (2012).
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variety of atypical and/or contingent workers who do not fit neatly into either category. 177
A popular recommendation for reform has been to create new categories of workers that
are not covered under the current framework.178 However, what these scholars often
overlook is the fact that the current dichotomy in the law correctly – even if accidentally
– reflects the efficient division of work into markets and firms within our economic
system.
This section argues that the entrepreneurial responsibilities test should be adopted
because it corresponds to the principle of fair play and the organization of our economic
activities into firms and markets for the benefit of all participants. The principle of fair
play imposes an obligation on participants of a cooperative enterprise to abide by the
rules of the enterprise in exchange for receiving its benefits. Our economic system is a
cooperative enterprise within which we organize our economic activity into markets and
firms so that we can all benefit from an efficient allocation of resources. Entrepreneurs
participate in the markets under the high-powered incentives of the price mechanism to
facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. Entrepreneurs then organize other workers,
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i.e., employees, into firms to avoid the costs of transacting in markets. Benefiting from
participating in our economic system, this section will argue, creates an obligation to
maintain the calibration of prices at socially optimal levels and ensuring that employees
are not exposed to the high-powered incentives in the market. This is what the
entrepreneurial responsibilities test helps to do.
A) The principle of fair play
The principle of fair play is typically evoked within discussions of political
obligations between political philosophers. The principle was introduced by H.L.A. Hart,
who argued that “when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to
rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when
required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their
submission.”179 For Hart, political obligations arise from a “mutuality of restrictions”
within such a joint enterprise between cooperating members of a society.180 John Rawls
drew on a similar principle of the same name by arguing that the moral obligation to obey
the law can be grounded within the duty of fair play, subject to several conditions and
modifications.181 In both cases, the main intuition at play is that a free rider within a
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cooperative scheme wrongs others who also participate within the scheme and do their
part in following its rules.
The principle of fair play has been met with both criticism and support among
political philosophers. M.B.E. Smith criticizes the principle by arguing that obligations
of fair play disappear when the scale and complexity of the cooperative enterprise
become large enough. If other members of the enterprise do not benefit from one’s
compliance with the rules and/or they are not harmed by one’s non-compliance, the
unfairness of non-compliance would appear to apply only to the group and not to any
individual, which Smith finds impossible.182 Defenders of the principle respond by
arguing that non-compliance within a cooperative enterprise wrongs other participants
even if it does not harm the participants or the enterprise.183 Robert Nozick criticizes the
principle by arguing that merely conferring a benefit on someone does not then create a
right to impose on the beneficiary an obligation to make a contribution.184 The argument
that one has an obligation to obey the rules of a cooperative scheme merely because one
benefits from it is flawed, he argues, because it ignores the element of consent. Just as
one may not give someone a book and just grab money from the person for
compensation, a government cannot confer benefits on its members to create a “general
floating debt which [it] can collect and use as it will.”185 A. John Simmons provides a
response to Nozick’s criticism by arguing that one can not only receive but also accept
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benefits without consent, and he and others have argued that mere reception of a benefit
does not make someone a participant within a cooperative enterprise.186 Nevertheless,
Simmons criticizes the principle of fair play by arguing that not many people would meet
the conditions for the acceptance of benefits in most political societies. Because
acceptance of a benefit requires either that someone try and succeed in obtaining it or that
one take it willingly and knowingly, Simmons argues, the principle of fair play would not
apply to the vast majority of a country’s citizens since they either do not recognize the
benefits of political membership and/or view the benefits as being purchased from
government rather than the outcome of social cooperation.187 Defenders of the principle
respond to Simmons by arguing that participation can occur without full awareness 188
and/or that acceptance is not necessary to incur an obligation to cooperate.189
Regardless of its applicability for political obligations in general, however, the
principle of fair play does not raise any similar concerns within the employer and worker
context. Smith’s concerns about the consequences of compliance and non-compliance do
not apply because economic free-riding has a real impact on other economic actors. If
employers externalize the costs of their enterprise to their employees who lack the
leverage to demand anything else, they would directly harm their workers in the form of
lower wages and also indirectly harm other market participants by taking an inefficient
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amount of risk. Nozick’s concerns about consent do not apply because the very nature of
hiring and working requires participation within the economic system. Nozick’s
argument might hold some weight against taxing non-working members of society on the
basis of the benefits they receive from the economic system. But employers and workers
are not bystanders to the scheme of economic cooperation. Rather than passively
receiving the benefits of the market, they actively participate within the system to earn
wages and/or profits. Thus, Simmons’ argument also does not apply. Employers and
workers clearly accept the benefits of participating in the economic system because they
are trying to gain a benefit through their participation. Although there are various “open”
benefits that members cannot avoid receiving in a society with a functioning economic
system, wages and profits are “readily available” benefits that can be easily avoided by
refraining from working at all.190 As a result, there aren’t likely any good reasons to deny
the validity of the principle of fair play in articulating a rule that enforces the division of
work within markets and firms within the U.S.
B) Markets and firms
We organize our economic activity within markets and firms because they help us
to efficiently allocate resources for the benefit of all in society. At their best, markets
enable us to coordinate our aggregate response to the scarcity of resources by putting
them to their highest valued use. Essential to the functioning of the market is the price
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mechanism, which centralizes and translates the disparate and complex bits of
information into a signal about local supply and demand across the entire market.191 The
utilization of the price mechanism in the market incentivizes us with the potential to
profit from making individual resource allocation decisions that correspond with overall
supply and demand for resources in society. When the supply of limes drops due to
agricultural issues in Mexico, for instance, the price system helps us to collectively
respond to the shortage by presenting to all of us an opportunity to profit from consuming
limes less and selling them to those who need or desire them more.
The opportunity to profit from changing prices in the market provides what is
known as a high-powered incentive for market participants. An incentive for an action is
high-powered when the consequences of the action accrue directly to the actor.192 If a
lime cost $1 yesterday but now costs $2 today, my incentive to sell the lime in the market
is high-powered since I would realize the entire $1 gain from selling the lime. On the
flipside, if I purchased a lime for $2 yesterday and can only sell it for $1 today, I would
bear the entirety of the $1 loss under a high-powered incentive system. In order for us all
to benefit from participating in the market, high-powered market incentives must be
calibrated accurately to reflect the “true” cost of the activity, i.e., the price at which a
given market activity would lead to an optimal allocation of resources within the market.
If I can realize a 100% gain if the relative supply of limes drops by half but stand to lose
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only 25% of my investment if the relative demand of limes drops by half, market
incentives would be over-powered since I would be incentivized to buy and sell more
limes than I should. Rather than efficiently allocating limes for the benefit of all, overpowered incentives would lead to an overconsumption of limes in society and lead to a
shortage. Thus, taxes and other costs of doing business imposed by the law are supposed
to calibrate the incentives of market activity at the socially-optimal level. Rather than
distorting the high-powered incentives of the market, they help us to keep them in
calibration by attributing the social costs of an economic activity to the actor.
Yet, despite the advantages of markets, we also need to organize some of our
economic activities in firms if we are to benefit from an efficient allocation of resources
in society. Economists typically view the firm as “islands of conscious power” within the
ocean of unconscious market coordination, “like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
buttermilk.”193 Rather than relying on the price mechanism, resource allocation within
firms proceeds through managerial direction. As mentioned above,194 leaving it up to the
manager to decide how to allocate resources within the firm can have an efficiency
advantage over the price mechanism in the market because there are a variety of costs
associated with transacting in the market. Central to these transactions costs is the ways
in which the high-powered incentives of the market distort and prevent the making of
enterprise-specific investments that would lead to a more efficient allocation of resources.
When one makes an investment in the market to support one’s business, the resources
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into which the investment is made become more valuable to the investor than other
similar resources in the market. If an employer makes an investment in a worker by
providing additional training specific to the employer’s business, for instance, the worker
becomes more valuable to the employer after the investment than other potential workers
in the market. However, the investor has no incentive to make such enterprise-specific
investments if the recipient of the investment can hold up the investor afterwards to
extract the benefits of investment. If an employer anticipates that a worker will refuse to
cooperate with managerial direction unless the firm confers the benefits of the investment
to the worker, the employer will not make an investment in the worker, even if it would
lead to a better allocation of resources – and thus the benefit of all – if the employer were
to make the investment.
From the point of view of social efficiency, then, firms help to calibrate incentives
in the market by eliminating the possibility for workers inside the firm to profit from
exploiting their position over the firm’s resources. When a firm’s workers follow
managerial direction in allocating resources inside the firm, the firm realizes the potential
gains and assumes the full costs associated with its workers’ activities. Workers may
benefit indirectly in the form of higher wages or other type of compensation, but the
incentives of the price mechanism do not motivate them in the same way it would if they
were operating directly in the market. In other words, firms substitute the high-powered
incentives of the market with low-powered incentives. An incentive for an action is lowpowered when the consequences of the action do not accrue directly to the actor. When a
worker in a firm helps to combine resources to create a new product for the firm to sell on
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the market, for instance, he works under low-powered incentives since the economic
results of his actions will not accrue directly to him. He is motivated, instead, by the
prospect of internal discipline and other non-market-oriented factors to perform his
resource allocation activities. The substitution of high-powered incentives for lowpowered incentives help to encourage employers to make socially efficient levels of
investment in labor and the means of production since the firm’s workers will not have
the same incentive to profit from exploiting their position in the enterprise to extract the
benefits of investment for themselves.
The organization of our economic activity into markets and firms thus represents
a joint enterprise where we all benefit from efficient resource allocation by accurately
calibrating the high-powered incentives of the market and eliminating them altogether for
certain types of activities by organizing them in firms. This bifurcation of our economic
activity results in a bifurcation of two different types of workers. The first is the
entrepreneur. As seen above, entrepreneurs are essential to the functioning of the market
and the price mechanism because they are the ones acting in markets based on the signals
provided by the price mechanism to allocate resources and drive economic
development.195 By assuming entrepreneurial responsibility for their economic activity,
entrepreneurs operate under the high-powered incentives of the market, exposing
themselves to financial liability for their activities, carrying out new combinations of
See, e.g., RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, at 271 (“Under the enterprise system, a special social class,
the business men, direct economic activity; they are in· the strict sense the producers, while the great· mass
of the population merely furnish them with productive services, placing their persons and their property at
the disposal of this class; the entrepreneurs also guarantee to those who furnish productive services a fixed
remuneration.”).
195
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resources, and bringing the market closer to equilibrium in the pursuit of profits.196 The
second is the employee. By giving up entrepreneurial responsibility for their economic
activity, employees operate under the low-powered incentives of the firm. As Knight
notes, employees essentially insure themselves against the high stakes of market activity
by forgoing participation in the market altogether and, instead, choosing to enter into a
contractual agreement with entrepreneurs to provide services in exchange for a fixed
amount of compensation.197
C) Profit and fair play
The principle of fair play limits the ways in which economic actors pursue profit
in society. Our economic system is a cooperative enterprise through which everyone
benefits from an efficient allocation of resources. As seen above, the benefits of
cooperation depend on entrepreneurs responding to well-calibrated incentives in the
market and on shielding other workers from the high-powered incentives of the price
mechanism. The principle of fair play suggests that participants within our economic
system have an obligation to act consistently with such an arrangement. Entrepreneurs
who are able to distort the prices of resources for their own advantage will wrong other
participants in our economic system by interfering with the market’s resource allocation
process. Conversely, workers who are able to pursue individual profit opportunities
while shielding themselves from the full risks and costs associated with market activity
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will wrong other participants in our economic system by making resource allocation
inside the firm costlier than it should be. The entrepreneurial responsibilities test helps to
prevent unfairness in our economic system by eliminating opportunities for
circumventing the terms of cooperation through worker misclassification.
One potential area for worker misclassification pertains to apportioning tort
liability. Employers often attempt to benefit from the current legal framework by
classifying their workers as independent contractors to avoid liability for damages
attributable to their enterprise. For example, in Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., two plaintiffs
sued Uber under the theory of respondeat superior for sexual assault allegedly suffered at
the hands of Uber drivers.198 In response, Uber moved for summary judgment on account
of its position that no employment relationship exists between it and its drivers as a
matter of law.199 And because it has a plausible claim that no employment exists under
existing tests for employee status,200 Uber has the opportunity to benefit by distorting the
price of ridesharing in our economic system by forcing its drivers (who would almost
never have enough assets to cover for significant damages) and victims to bear the costs
that should be built into its prices in the market.
Under the entrepreneurial responsibilities test, Uber would be found as an
employer of its drivers201 and thus held liable for the harms caused by its drivers,
provided that other elements of the claim are met. The principle of holding employers
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vicariously liable lies “in a deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot
justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of
its activities.”202 And although the risks associated with accidents are not the risks
associated with economic uncertainty, the entrepreneurial responsibilities test
nevertheless yields results that are consistent with this principle by helping to prevent
employers from acting unfairly. Uber should bear the costs associated with connecting
drivers with riders because it – and not the drivers – is entitled to potential pure profits
associated with the activity. Within this framework, Uber has the responsibility to
manage the costs associated with screening drivers and providing the infrastructure to
prevent sexual assaults by its drivers. These costs will likely be passed on to both riders
in the form of higher prices and to drivers in the form of lower compensation, but these
costs should nevertheless be managed by the enterprise that is ultimately responsible for
the market consequences of the drivers’ activities. Uber’s attempt to earn the profits
associated with ridesharing services while circumventing the price mechanism’s function
of forcing it to internalize the costs of ridesharing services wrongs other market
participants by interfering with the efficient allocation of resources in society.
Employers also frequently misclassify workers in an attempt to avoid compliance
with a variety of federal and state statutory obligations associated with an employment
relationship. For example, FedEx was able to avoid compliance with the N.L.R.A. and
prevent its workers from exercising their collective bargaining rights in FedEx Home
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Delivery because the D.C. Circuit ruled that its drivers were independent contractors
rather than employees.203 The D.C. Circuit ruling thus allowed FedEx to manipulate the
means-ends distinction the law over worker control and thus import and expose its
drivers to the high-powered incentives of the market.204 If entrepreneurs are able to
expose their employees to the risks associated with market participation while retaining
the opportunity to profit from their enterprise, they wrong not only their employees but
the rest of society by contributing to the misallocation of resources. The entrepreneurial
responsibilities test can prevent such an outcome by identifying the entrepreneur for all
different types of regulatory purposes.
As noted above, the government regulates the employment relationship for a wide
variety of reasons. And although some criticize courts for not paying enough attention to
the purpose behind each statutory protection,205 instituting a variety of tests for employee
status for each statutory purpose can lead to a confusing array of potential tests to
navigate. The entrepreneurial responsibilities test, on the other hand, can provide a single
rationale for the wide variety of governmental regulation over the employment
relationship. The principle of fair play and the bifurcation of economic activity into
markets and firms suggest that regulating the employment relationship should be
motivated by the goal of shielding employees from the high-powered incentives of
market participation and calibrating market incentives to the socially optimal level.
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Because the discipline of market participation will lead to employers attempting to
extract as many concessions as possible from workers, allowing the high-powered
incentives of the labor market to govern negotiations between employers and potential
employees will result in terms of employment where workers bear the down-side costs of
market participation without any opportunity to pursue entrepreneurial profits. In
essence, the incentives of the market are too powerful without statutory protections for
employees, and the lack of employee protections will undermine the purpose of
organizing some economic activity in firms. Regulations that restrict the ability of
employers to extract concessions regarding wages, hours, collective bargaining rights,
and discriminatory practices help to calibrate the incentives of the labor market to a more
socially efficient level by ensuring that employees can bargain to shield themselves inside
the firm from the high-powered incentives of the market. Taxes, retirement benefits, and
other financial obligations incurred by the employer and independent contractors also
should be motivated by the goal of calibrating the incentives of the market to ensure that
entrepreneurs operate under a socially optimal cost structure.
Lastly, worker misclassification can lead to the interference with the
entrepreneur’s allocative control over productive resources. One common area of
concern pertains to property rights over work products. For instance, in Natkin v.
Winfrey, two photographers sued their employer after their photos were published in a
book without their permission.206 Although the employer claimed that the photographers
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were its employees over whom they exercised significant control, the court applied the
thirteen factor Federal control test to hold that the photographers had rights over the
photographs because they were independent contractors. Among other things, property
rights over productive resources grants the right holder to extract additional concessions
from the user of the resources.
The entrepreneurial responsibilities test provides a rationale for determining
property rights over productive resources by ensuring that the entrepreneur be given the
right to exercise allocative control over them. In the case of Winfrey, the court’s ruling
gave the photographers a right over the photographs that could be used to extract
additional compensation for their use by the employer. However, it is important that only
entrepreneurs be granted this right because it would otherwise privilege employees to
partake in the profit opportunities of the market. If employees were granted property
rights over resources over which the entrepreneur exercises allocative control, they could
disrupt the entrepreneurial process by appropriating some of the entrepreneur’s profits as
compensation that cannot be attributed to the costs of their labor. Such an arrangement
would not only harm the entrepreneur but also interfere with the efficient allocation of
resources by hindering the necessary movement and combination of resources in the
market.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its flaws, the central insight of the entrepreneurial opportunities test – that
workers should be afforded the legal protection of employee status unless they have an
opportunity to profit from their work – is sound. What the D.C. Circuit has gotten wrong
is what constitutes an entrepreneur. A worker with a mere opportunity to profit by
working smarter is not an entrepreneur. What the classic three economic theories of
entrepreneurship show is that the entrepreneur perform an economic function of
assuming entrepreneurial responsibility for their economic activity. The three markers of
entrepreneurial responsibility are: (1) the assumption of liability for economic
uncertainty, (2) the exercise of allocative control over productive resources, and (3) the
buying of resources to sell in the market for a profit. Only when a worker’s
responsibilities correspond with all three markers should courts consider her an
entrepreneur. Otherwise, courts may contribute to perpetuating inefficiencies in society
by allowing some parties to exploit opportunities to engage in worker misclassification in
order to extract resources for themselves at the cost of everyone else in society.
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ESSAY 3:
Spontaneous Orders and Stakeholder Value Creation: Toward an Equilibration
Model of Managing for Stakeholders

I. INTRODUCTION
Stakeholder theory operates on descriptive, instrumental, and normative levels
(Donaldson and Preston 1995). At the instrumental level, stakeholder theorists have long
argued that managing for stakeholders is not only ethical but also conducive for firm
success (e.g., Berman et al. 1999; Freeman 1984; Freeman et al. 2010; Hillman and Keim
2001; Jones 1995). A recent area of focus on this link between ethics and firm success
has been the process of stakeholder management, typically described as the “managingfor-stakeholders approach” (Freeman et al. 2007). The managing-for-stakeholders
approach emphasizes the responsibility of the manager/entrepreneur to create value for
all of the firm’s stakeholders (Freeman 2010). Within this view, stakeholder value is
understood broadly as utility or happiness (Harrison and Wicks 2013; Jones and Felps
2013), and value creation is thus implicitly understood as an increase in stakeholder
utility/happiness. As such, the managing-for-stakeholders approach argues that managers
can help the firm succeed by intentionally increasing the utility/happiness of all
stakeholders involved. Some have operationalized this insight by focusing on how the
manager can directly create value for stakeholders by taking actions that increase their
utility/happiness. By drawing on an often overlooked aspect of stakeholder theory that
the firm is an equilibrating mechanism (Venkataraman 2002), this paper argues that the
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managing-for-stakeholders approach should also focus on managing the process by which
stakeholders create value for themselves.
By emphasizing the managerial responsibility to increase the utility/happiness of
stakeholders, the managing-for-stakeholders approach implicitly assumes three distinct
necessary conditions for managerial knowledge within the process of stakeholder value
creation. First, the manager must know what are the stakeholder interests. Second, the
manager must know how his actions will actually advance the interests of his
stakeholders and thus create value for them. Third, the manager must know how to
advance the interests of various stakeholder groups simultaneously without resorting to
tradeoffs. Unfortunately, most of the focus of the managing-for-stakeholders approach
has been only on the third condition, with little attention having been paid to the first and
second conditions. Despite well-worn criticisms from shareholder-centric theorists (e.g.,
Jensen 2002; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004), stakeholder theorists have long emphasized
that creating value for all stakeholders does not necessarily mean that shareholders will
benefit less than they would under the traditional shareholder primacy approach. Since
stakeholder interests are joint rather than opposed to each other, stakeholder theorists
argue, managers can and should create value for all stakeholders without resorting to
tradeoffs (Freeman 2010; Porter and Kramer 2011). The recent focus on stakeholder
utility functions builds on this insight by arguing that synergy in stakeholder value
creation is possible due to the multi-attribute nature of stakeholder utility functions
(Tantalo and Priem 2016). However, little attention has been paid to how much
managers can actually access stakeholder utility functions and, even if they have
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adequate knowledge of them, how they can know that their actions will actually increase
the utility of any of their stakeholders, let alone all or most of them.
This paper presents an approach to stakeholder management rooted within the
theory of spontaneous order – what I will call the stakeholder-equilibration model – that
addresses the first and second necessary conditions of managerial knowledge for
stakeholder value creation. To the extent that it recognizes the issue at all, the existing
model of stakeholder management that asks managers to act in light of their knowledge
of stakeholder utility functions to create stakeholder value – what this paper will call the
top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model – is limited by the problem of managerial
knowledge. The stakeholder-equilibration model, on the other hand, involves managers
attending to and reinforcing the conditions that allow stakeholders to create value for
themselves. The theory of spontaneous order (Hayek 1973) can explain why
stakeholders pursuing their own interests can create stakeholder value in ways that can
supplement – and sometimes limit – managerial efforts to directly create value for them.
Rather than interfering with the spontaneous ordering of stakeholder interactions within
the firm, managers can reinforce the conditions of stakeholder value creation by focusing
on identifying and refining organizational norms, which can lead not only to stakeholder
value creation but also to a sustainable competitive advantage for the firm.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I argue that the problems associated with
localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison of utility, and bounded rationality impose
significant limits on the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model. Managers do not
know enough nor process the knowledge that they possess to create as much stakeholder
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value as possible. Second, I present the theory of spontaneous order as an approach to
overcome some of these limitations to managerial knowledge by relying on decentralized
decision-making. And because firms are riddled with spontaneous orders of stakeholder
interactions, managers can look to them as sources of stakeholder value creation in
addition to their own knowledge of stakeholder utility functions. Third, I apply the
insight of spontaneous ordering within firms to present a managerial approach to
stakeholder value creation – the stakeholder-equilibration approach – that leverages the
power of spontaneous orders. By focusing on identifying and refining organizational
norms, managers can encourage spontaneous ordering of stakeholder interactions, which
can lead to a sustainable competitive advantage for the firm because it will help
stakeholders create value for themselves, help achieve strategic fit, and foster the
development of a valuable resource.
II. THE PROBLEM OF MANAGERIAL KNOWLEDGE
Managers who accept the managing-for-stakeholders approach attempt to create
as much value as possible for stakeholders without resorting to tradeoffs. But in order to
create value for stakeholders, a manager must know what are the stakeholder interests
and how his actions will advance them. This section argues that the top-downstakeholder-utility-function model has significant limitations because it overlooks the
problems of localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison of utility, and bounded
rationality.
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A) Limitations with the Stakeholder Utility Function Approach
The top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model frames the issue of managerial
knowledge to consist only of managerial access to multi-variate stakeholder utility
functions (Harrison et al. 2010; Tantalo and Priem 2016). Stakeholder utility functions
represent the preferences of stakeholder groups with respect to a comprehensive set of
goods, services, and other factors. Within this view, managers gain access to stakeholder
utility functions – and thus gain knowledge of what are the stakeholder interests –
through two different mechanisms. First, managers gain nuanced access to stakeholder
utility functions by creating trust between the firm and its stakeholders, which induces
stakeholders to reveal information about their preference orderings (Harrison et al. 2010).
Second, managers discover the factors that drive stakeholder utility through the exercise
of entrepreneurial judgment by continually and actively attending to the demands of
stakeholder groups (Tantalo and Priem 2016). Both of these accounts assume that
managers will be able to translate their knowledge of the drivers of stakeholder utility
into decisions that will actually create value for stakeholders and supply the firm with a
competitive advantage.
Unfortunately, the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model has significant
limitations due to the problems of localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison of
utility, and bounded rationality. Firstly, the problem of localized knowledge refers
generally to the fact that the information needed for rational resource allocation resides in
the “dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the
separate individuals possess” (Hayek 1945: 519). Because stakeholder utility functions
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reside within the mind of each stakeholder, managers face an enormous challenge of
obtaining the information needed to perform the calculations associated with creating
value for stakeholders.
Secondly, even if managers somehow gain access to the knowledge needed for
stakeholder value creation, they have an impossible task of aggregating the knowledge
into a coherent whole due to the problem of interpersonal comparison of utility. The
problem of interpersonal comparison of utility arises from the fact that modern theories
of utility only represent an individual’s index of ordinal preference rankings (Binmore
2009; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Since an individual’s utility function refers
only to one’s preference orderings, it does not have any relation to the utility function of
another person. As a result, it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to compare
the utility of different individuals in any meaningful way (Elster and Roemer 1991;
Hausman 1995). Managers who attempt to create value for stakeholders without
tradeoffs by acting on their knowledge of stakeholder utility functions are likely to face
serious problems because acting on their knowledge of stakeholder utility functions to
increase stakeholder utility implicitly entails comparing the utility of different
stakeholders to avoid tradeoffs and to know when value has been created.
Lastly, even if it were somehow possible to obtain access to and make meaningful
comparisons between stakeholder utility functions, attempts to process the information
into actionable insights will be significantly limited by the problem of bounded
rationality. Bounded rationality refers to the fact that economic actors have limited
cognitive resources and abilities (Simon 1955). Managers are human and are subject to
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the same limitations that constrain the rest of us, and it is simply asking too much of them
to simultaneously process countless relevant variables associated with even simple
stakeholder utility functions in ways that can lead to decisions that will optimally satisfy
a maximal number of stakeholders at once.
Taken together, the problems of localized knowledge, interpersonal comparison
of utility, and bounded rationality create significant limitations to the efficacy of the topdown-stakeholder-utility-function model. The knowledge that managers need to create
value for stakeholders is not only of local conditions, which theoretically could be
obtained through third party observation, but also of incomplete and highly unstable
subjective orderings of preferred states that reside only within the minds of individual
stakeholders. Furthermore, stakeholder analysis is necessarily a dynamic exercise
(Windsor 2010). Stakeholder utility functions are multi-attribute, extremely complex,
and constantly under revision, and stakeholder groups are comprised of a diverse and
often constantly changing flux of individuals and firms with varying interests. It is
practically impossible for managers to gain access to this information, aggregate or
compare them in any meaningful way, and then evaluate a particular action in light of the
effect that it would have on the utility of any stakeholder, let alone many of them at once.
Instead, the practical implementation of the utility-function approach typically entails
relying significantly on an implicit cognitive model where managers make intuitive
judgments about what actions they feel will lead to greater value for stakeholders.
Even a cursory example of a cartoonish simplification illustrates the difficulty of
managers creating value for stakeholders based on any rational calculation of stakeholder
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utility functions. Suppose that stakeholders reveal their preferences to managers because
they trust the firm. Since stakeholder utility functions are multi-variate and
extraordinarily complex, no stakeholder will be able to reveal his utility function in full.
Instead, he will provide small insights about simple preferences. For instance, Employee
A may reveal that he is willing to trade off a slightly lower salary for a modern office
space. On the other hand, Employee B may reveal that she prefers an increase in salary
over a more generous work-life balance. How will the manager have any idea how a
modern office space might impact the utility of Employee B or how a more rigorous
schedule might impact the utility of Employee A? What happens if Employee A changes
his mind? What if learning about Employee B’s salary makes Employee A jealous and
decreases his utility? What if Employee A’s preference for a modern office space is
interrelated with firm prestige, which will decrease with lower salaries? What happens if
the manager hires Employee C after making changes, only to find out that Employee C
prefers more flexible hours and is indifferent about the office space? The problems for
the manager are potentially never-ending, and one must also consider the decrease in the
manager’s own utility as a result of attempting to juggle multiple demands at once.
B) The Inadequacy of Stakeholder Group Utility Functions
At this point, some stakeholder theorists might respond to the problems outlined
above by arguing that top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model entails responsiveness
to stakeholder groups rather than individual stakeholders (e.g., Jones and Felps 2013).
But even after assuming that it is actually possible to segment stakeholders into
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meaningful groupings, formulating an aggregation of individual stakeholder utility
functions into a single stakeholder group function is bound to be just as difficult as
attempting to work with individual stakeholder utility functions, if not more so. Any
attempt to formulate a group utility function in an informed manner will necessarily
entail collecting and processing the underlying utility functions of individual
stakeholders. As a result, grouping stakeholder utility functions cannot avoid the
problems outlined above. Managers will still need access to the same localized and
dispersed information about individual stakeholder utility functions, and utility will still
need to be interpersonally comparable if individual utility functions are to be aggregated
into a single group function. And although it may require slightly less processing power
for managers to calculate the effects on stakeholder utility functions in batches, doing so
would also create additional layers of calculation that are likely to introduce serious
problems, particularly since there is likely a high level of interactivity between various
stakeholder interests.
Alternatively, if the managing-for-stakeholders approach entails making
reasonable assumptions about stakeholder groups in order to simplify the problem at
hand, managers will run the risk of divorcing their decision-making from reality and thus
undermining the very core of the managing-for-stakeholders approach. Recognizing the
impossibility of aggregating individual utility functions, welfare economists turn to a
construct known as a social welfare function. Although social welfare functions
represent the preferences of society at large, they are actually abstractions that have very
little to do with the actual utility of individuals in society. Rather than reflecting
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underlying conditions, social welfare functions merely reflect the theorist’s own ethical
judgment about distributive concerns (Hammond 1991). Managerial attempts to
formulate a single utility function for each stakeholder group would be a similar analogue
to the formulation of social welfare functions. And as is the case with social welfare
functions, the managerial formulation of stakeholder group utility functions also would
be abstracted away from what individual stakeholders actually want.
Regardless of whether or not a significant amount of abstraction poses a problem
for welfare economics, it is certainly a significant problem for the managing-forstakeholders approach, which emphasizes the importance and efficacy of intentionally
overinvesting in stakeholders, i.e., allocating resources to various stakeholders at a level
that goes beyond what is necessary to ensure their willful participation (Freeman et al.
2007; Harrison et al. 2010). First, divorcing stakeholder utility functions from reality
would nullify the very reason for overinvestment in stakeholders since there would no
longer be a need for managers to gain access to stakeholder utility functions. Rather than
overinvesting to engender trust, managers would feel free to make decisions based on
what they think stakeholder preferences should be rather than overinvesting in
stakeholders to find out what they actually prefer. Second, divorcing stakeholder utility
functions from reality would eliminate the competitive advantage associated with
stakeholder overinvestment since making reasonable assumptions about what
stakeholders want as a group can be done just as easily by managers who attempt to
extract as much value as possible from stakeholders as those who overinvest in them. In
fact, holding the ability to anticipate stakeholder demands as constant, managers who
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overinvest in stakeholders will be at a competitive disadvantage since they would use
more resources than managers who invest in stakeholders minimally without being able
to meet stakeholder needs any better. Third, divorcing stakeholder utility functions from
reality would undermine the ethical core of stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory rests
on a normative core comprised of a convergence of ethical positions that highlight the
concern for others in addition to self-interest (Jones et al. 2007). However, once
managers unilaterally determine what stakeholders should want as a group rather than
attempting to find out what they actually want, the focus shifts away from this otherregarding normative core. Rather than focusing on the interests of stakeholders,
managers would be focusing – perhaps narcissistically – on their own ethical judgments
about stakeholder interests instead.
III. SPONTANEOUS ORDERING WITHIN THE FIRM
Managers can begin to address the problems of localized knowledge,
interpersonal comparison of utility, and bounded rationality by turning to the theory of
spontaneous order. A spontaneous order is “the result of human action but not the
execution of human design” (Ferguson 1767: 122). Leveraging the power of spontaneous
orders can provide managers with a way to cope with limits to their knowledge because
spontaneous orders create value for everyone within the system through decentralized
decision-making. This section argues that, although there are ways in which the firm is
constituted by intentional design, there are also important aspects of the firm that reflect a
spontaneous ordering of stakeholder relations. Recognizing the spontaneous ordering of
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stakeholders within the firm can enable managers to overcome the problems associated
with managerial knowledge and supplement the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function
model with a bottom-up model of stakeholder value creation within the firm.
A) The Theory of Spontaneous Order
A spontaneous order refers to a stable state of affairs at the macro-level that
emerge through the aggregation of micro-level responses to a coordinating mechanism.
Unlike made orders, which are organized around directives issued by a particular
individual or institution that aim at a particular context with a particular purpose,
spontaneous orders are organized around coordinating mechanisms that were not
designed by anyone, are abstract, and are without purpose (Hayek 1960). Take, for
instance, the traditionally understood difference between the allocation of goods within
firms and markets. Hayek considers the firm to be a made order because it allocates
resources internally through a central decision-making process (1973). After evaluating
the firm’s strategic position, management will issue directives to employees on how to
allocate the firm’s resources to achieve its intended goals. Such activity within firms is
thus organized around a centralized decision-making body that issues directives aimed at
a particular context with a specific purpose in mind. Markets, on the other hand,
represent a paradigmatic example of a spontaneous order. Within markets, the social
allocation of goods is achieved through a price system that coordinates individuals acting
in accordance with their self-interest. There is no one who created the price system.
Instead, it is a mode for communicating localized information across society that
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humanity only “stumbled upon… without understanding it” (Hayek 1945: 528). The
price system is also abstract, i.e., it functions in accordance with generalizable rules
rather than context-specific facts. The price for a good will increase if its demand
outpaces its supply, regardless of what kind of a good it is and what the reasons may be
for its shortage. Lastly, the price system acts without purpose. The purposes held by
most market participants deal with their individual goals and not the overall social effects
of their decision-making. Of course, the aggregation of actions taken to achieve
individual purposes serves a social function of coordinating the use of dispersed and
localized knowledge in a wide, complex network to allocate goods and services.
However, although this function can be recognized by those who aim to leverage it for
their own purposes, it cannot be said to be a purpose that is inherent within the price
system since no one enacted the system with an intention to bring about its desirable
results. Nor can anyone manipulate the price system intentionally to achieve an intended
outcome at the systemic level.
Because spontaneous orders involve dispersed actors utilizing their localized
knowledge in response to a coordinating mechanism to allocate resources and achieve
stability, they do not depend on any centralized decision-maker. This decentralization of
decision-making allows them to avoid the pitfalls of knowledge that place limitations on
the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model. The avoidance of central decisionmaking helps to alleviate the problem of localized knowledge because individual
stakeholders already know their own preferences better than anyone else. It also
alleviates the problem of interpersonal comparison of utility because there is no one who
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is making any utility comparisons at all. Lastly, it drastically reduces the problem of
bounded rationality because actors within a spontaneous order act only need to respond to
a coordinating mechanism to guide their action. For instance, the price mechanism can
achieve an efficient allocation of a scarce resource even if market actors do not perform
any calculation of social welfare relative to the known supply and demand for the
resource. All they need to do is to respond to the price mechanism in accordance with
their self-interest by producing more of the resource and/or consuming less of it (Hayek
1945).
The decentralization of decision-making through a central coordination
mechanism within spontaneous orders can lead to greater welfare – and thus more value
that is created – for those within the system than through central decision-making. As
noted above, spontaneous orders are more efficient in coordinating the use of knowledge
to allocate scarce resources under changing circumstances. Capitalism, for instance, has
long been justified as a superior alternative to socialism because it relies on a
decentralized means of resource allocation, which allows for greater innovation and
adaptation in meeting consumer demand (Boettke 1998; Land et al. 1994; Smith 1776;
Van Parijs 1995; Von Mises 1922). Moreover, spontaneous orders can lead to greater
welfare within the system because they are more efficient in the way they govern
exchange relationships. Legal scholars, for instance, have long found that informal
coordinating mechanisms around which individuals organize within spontaneous orders
are typically cheaper and more effective enforcement mechanisms than formal
mechanisms (Bernstein 1992; Scott 2003). Lastly, and perhaps most importantly if
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liberty is a value in and of itself, spontaneous orders can lead to greater welfare within
the system by preserving and promoting the liberty of its participants. Spontaneous
orders are consistent with liberty because they are constituted by individuals acting in
accordance with their own wills rather than through the directives of a centralized
authority (Hayek 1973). In addition to possibly being a value in and of itself, liberty can
also lead to greater progress and thus greater welfare because it “leaves room for the
unforeseeable and unpredictable” (Hayek 1960: 29). Rather than relying on human
design to maximize value based on what is foreseeable at the time, preserving liberty for
those within the system leaves room for the entrepreneurial element to discover new
opportunities for value creation based on localized knowledge of changing circumstances
(Kirzner 1973).
B) Relational Contracts and Spontaneous Orders Within Firms
Despite Hayek’s categorization of the firm as a made order, there is a long
tradition of scholarship within organizational studies that have uncovered spontaneous
ordering as a central feature of firms. The insight began with the idea that the firm can be
thought of as a nexus of contracts (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Since its introduction,
the nexus-of-contracts view has become the dominant paradigm for theories of the firm.
Even stakeholder theorists have largely embraced this view, with only minor
modifications to challenge the norm of shareholder primacy that many nexus-of-contracts
theories of the firm assume (Blair and Stout 1999; Freeman and Evan 1990). The nexusof-contracts approach to the firm brings spontaneous ordering inside the firm by arguing
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that the firm is constituted by a similar process as the market process, which is the
paradigmatic example of spontaneous ordering. In one of the classic articulations of the
nexus-of-contracts firm, for instance, Jensen and Meckling argue that the firm is like the
market in that it is the outcome of a complex process within which “the conflicting
objectives of individuals... are brought into equilibrium within a framework of
contractual relations” (1976: 311). Within this view, the firm is an aggregation of
decentralized actions taken by firm participants in pursuit of their own interests, just as
the market is. As will be explained below, the primary difference between spontaneous
ordering within markets and firms is the usage of alternative coordinating mechanisms.
Whereas spontaneous ordering is coordinated by the price system within markets, it is
coordinated by organizational culture within firms.
Although it may seem upon first glance as if the nexus-of-contracts approach to
the firm overstates the decentralization of stakeholder relations within the firm, it
becomes clear that spontaneous orders are prevalent within the firm once relational
contracts are disaggregated from formal contracts. Modern theorists of the firm have
recognized that firms are riddled with not only formal contracts but relational contracts as
well (Baker et al. 2002; Gibbons 2005). In fact, many modern theories now understand
the firm as a nexus of relational contracts in addition to formal contracts (Coff 1999; Kim
and Mahoney 2005; Zingales 2000). Economists distinguish formal and relational
contracts by asking whether the terms of an economic exchange are specified ex ante in
such a way that they can be verified and enforced ex post by a third party (Gibbons
2005). A formal contract is an economic exchange that specifies the terms of the
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agreement in a way that can be enforced by a third party in the future. A contract to
deliver a good on a certain day in exchange for a certain price, for instance, is a formal
contract because it is easy for a third party, e.g., a court, to determine whether each party
fulfilled its end of the bargain and to enforce its terms. Relational contracts, on the other
hand, cannot be enforced in such a way. Rather than specifying the terms of the
agreement ex ante as formal contracts do, they leave the nature of the bargain openended. The ambiguity and flexibility built into relational contracts allow contracting
parties to take advantage of new information and adapt to changing circumstances (Baker
et al. 2002). Unfortunately, these same features also render third-party enforcement very
difficult and expensive, if not impossible, because there is never any clear specification
of contract terms to enforce. As a result, relational contracts are “sustained by the
shadow of the future” rather than the threat of enforcement by a third party (Gibbons and
Henderson 2012: 1350).
The spontaneous ordering of formal contracts within the firm is difficult to
recognize because they are the result of both intentional and spontaneous processes.
Because formal contracts reflect an attempt by stakeholders to govern their economic
exchange ex ante, they involve a significant amount of intentional design. The formal
contracts that constitute the firm have particular intentionality because they represent an
effort to replace the spontaneous ordering of the market with an intentionally designed
transaction that aims to reduce transaction costs and align interests (Williamson 1991).
The decision to allocate more labor within a particular department, for instance, is a
managerial decision that is made with a particular purpose for a particular context.

133
Nevertheless, there is still a fair amount of spontaneous ordering in the way that formal
contracts aggregate into the firm itself. The nexus-of-contracts view of the firm envisions
firm participants bargaining in light of their self-interests without any ex ante regard for
the system as a whole (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991). Within this view, there is no
predetermined design for intrafirm relationships. Instead, the firm is shaped through the
self-regarding wishes of its participants that are mediated through a bargaining process
within the context of the broader market for labor and corporate governance. As a result,
both the exact shape and nature of each formal contract and the overall shape of the
constellation of formal contracts that results from this process will include elements that
are beyond the intentions of management or the firm’s founders. Furthermore, the level
of complexity within most organizations can lead to decisions that were not intended by
any particular individual and thus are attributable to only the organization itself (Pettit
2007). When multiple individuals are responsible for the execution of these contracts, for
instance, the resulting nexus of formal contracts will not reflect the intentional design of
any particular individual. Instead, it will be ordered in accordance with a firm’s decisionmaking procedure that can only be attributed to the firm itself.
Regardless of how much spontaneous ordering there is of formal contracts within
the firm, however, spontaneous orders are prevalent within the firm because the vast
majority of the relationships between stakeholders are governed by relational contracts
rather than formal contracts. Typically, stakeholders only enter into formal contracts
with the firm itself rather than with other stakeholders. Take, for instance, a simple case
of a manager and a junior employee within a firm. Aside from any potential collective
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bargaining arrangements, the manager will have a formal contract with the firm that
governs his employment in a way that could be enforced by courts in the event of a
breach or a dispute, and the junior employee will have the same. The relationship
between the manager and the junior employee, on the other hand, is not governed by any
formal contract. For instance, there is no formal remedy for the junior employee if the
manager decides to skip a scheduled meeting with her without informing her of his plans.
A violation of most of the rights and obligations implicit within their working
relationship must be addressed directly between the manager and the junior employee
within the context of their relationship. Even if a third party, e.g., the HR department,
gets involved in the dispute through an escalation policy, the outcome of any resolution
to the dispute will have nothing to do with the contract that the employee signed with the
firm. Intrafirm relationships, for the most part, are governed through an informal
relational process rather than a formal one. As a result, although formal contracts
constitute an important backdrop within the context of stakeholder interaction, much of
the contractual relationships within the firm are relational, not formal.
And unlike formal contracts, relational contracts within the firm are almost
entirely ordered spontaneously. Hayek argued that a large-scale society, e.g., the social
order within many modern communities, is a spontaneous order because it emerges from
an evolutionary process within which individuals in society each go about their activity in
accordance with rules within society that are not intentionally designed by anyone
(1973). Relational contracts create a spontaneous order within the firm in an analogous
way. Just as social norms coordinate individual action within societies, organizational
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culture, defined here as “a complex set of values, beliefs, assumptions, and symbols that
define the way in which a firm conducts its business” (Barney 1986: 657), coordinates
the spontaneous ordering of relational contracts within the firm. Relational contracts
come into existence and evolve through an iterated process during which stakeholders
respond to each other’s behavior in light of their shared knowledge about their tasks and
about each other (Gibbons and Henderson 2012). Organizational culture shapes the
shared knowledge base among stakeholders by providing them with a shared frame for
interpreting their interactions and with informal incentives/pressures that send signals for
how they ought to relate with each other. Just as a spontaneous order emerges from
interactions between those who live within a large scale society as they follow the rules
in society, a spontaneous order emerges within the firm through the relational contracts
between stakeholders as they interact with each other within the context of their
organization’s culture.
Lastly, like the price system and rules in society, organizational culture shares the
characteristics of coordinating mechanisms that lead to a spontaneous ordering of microlevel processes. As a coordinating mechanism, organizational culture shares many of the
characteristics of other coordinating mechanisms for other kinds of spontaneous orders.
Culture emerges from a dispersed collection of interactions rather through intentional
design. Even though others may try to manipulate it, as some do to the price system, its
overall function in response to the aggregation of individual interactions cannot be
predicted or controlled. Moreover, organizational culture is abstract. Rather than a rule
that may govern a particular aspect of a specific kind of interaction, organizational
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culture acts at a general level to shape all aspects of stakeholder interactions. Lastly,
because it is emergent rather than planned, there is no purpose embedded within
organizational culture. Although managers may attempt to leverage or even modify
aspects of the culture to achieve their goals, the multiplicity of cultures within an
organization, along with its interactivity and complexity (Barney 1986; Gregory 1983;
Smircich 1983), will result in only a partial infusion of purpose within the culture, at best.
The broad pattern of the nexus of relational contracts within the firm as they are shaped
and governed by its culture, then, exhibit all the signs that other types of spontaneous
orders exhibit. And given the prevalence of relational contracts within the firm, it is not
difficulty to see that there is a significant presence of spontaneous orders within firms.
IV. THE STAKEHOLDER EQUILIBRATION MODEL
The prevalence of spontaneous orders within the firm paves the way for managers
to leverage the advantages of spontaneous ordering to create value for stakeholders. This
section argues that stakeholder theory already has resources within it to take advantage of
spontaneous ordering within the firm because it envisions the firm as an equilibrating
mechanism rather than as a governance mechanism. Because norms within an
organization shape and reflect its culture, managers can reinforce the conditions under
which stakeholders can create value for themselves by identifying and refining the
constellation of organizational norms within the firm as they adjudicate stakeholder
interests. This approach to stakeholder management – what I will call the stakeholderequilibration model – allows managers to translate the process of stakeholder value
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creation into a sustainable competitive advantage because it will create more value for
stakeholders, help achieve strategic fit, and foster the development of a valuable firm
resource.
A) Stakeholder Equilibration
The stakeholder-equilibration model builds on the claim that stakeholder theory
views the firm as an equilibrating mechanism rather than a governance mechanism
(Venkataraman 2002). The manager of a firm as a governance mechanism engages in a
logic of control to create value for the firm and/or its shareholders. For instance, modern
theories of the firm often view the distinguishing feature of firms to be the residual rights
of control established by contract or property rights that the manager/entrepreneur can
exercise to govern relations with other firm participants (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986;
Williamson 1975). Within this view, the value provided by labor and other productive
inputs is to be carefully managed and extracted so as to enable maximal economic returns
for the firm and/or its shareholders. On the other hand, the manager of a firm as an
equilibration mechanism engages in a logic of adjudication to align and reinforce
stakeholder interests as they create value for themselves within the context of the firm.
This alternative account views the firm as a nexus of formal and relational contracts that
serves as an equilibrium point for stakeholders who pursue their own monetary and nonmonetary interests. Within this view, value is co-created and captured by the firm’s
stakeholders through contractual processes (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004; Priem
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2007; Ramirez 1999), with no stakeholder group receiving prima facie priority over
others.
In both the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function and stakeholder-equilibration
models, managers play a central role in allocating resources within the firm. However,
resource allocation is not synonymous with the stakeholder idea of creating value for
stakeholders without resorting to tradeoffs. For instance, managers who pay employees
above their market rates may create more value for these employees. The impact on this
action on other stakeholders, however, can often lead a corresponding decrease in value
for them. Suppliers or shareholders may have to be paid less, and customers may have to
pay more. In fact, increasing stakeholder value on one dimension often leads to a
decrease in value in another dimension (Grant et al. 2007). Higher employee
compensation, for instance, could lead to decreases in value for these very employees if
they have to work harder, longer, or in otherwise more challenging social, emotional, or
technical working conditions. As a result, unilateral actions such as an employee pay
increase is often not so much an act of stakeholder value creation as much as it is an act
of stakeholder value redistribution. Value creation for stakeholders within the firm
requires a greater focus on the quality and nature of the relationships between
stakeholders rather than on decisions that pertain merely to resource allocation.
The source of value creation within the stakeholder-equilibration model lies
within the spontaneous ordering of formal and informal contractual processes within the
firm. Within the model, the primary managerial role is to support the contractual
processes by which each stakeholder applies her localized knowledge of her immediate
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context and of her own subjective preferences to create value for herself. Stakeholders
interact with each other through formal and relational contractual processes because it
advances their interests to do so (Freeman 2010). As a result, the contractual processes
through which stakeholders pursue their interests can constitute significant opportunities
for stakeholders to create value for themselves. And because stakeholders have greater
knowledge of their set of preferences and their local context than managers do, they have
opportunities to create value for themselves within the spontaneous ordering of
stakeholder interactions in ways that managers cannot know within the top-downstakeholder-utility-function model.
When managers make resource allocation decisions, then, the stakeholder
equilibration model implies that managers ought to do so differently. As is the case
between the managing-for-stakeholders approach and the traditional approach to business
(Freeman et al. 2007), the crucial difference between the stakeholder-equilibration model
and the traditional model of management control is intent. Rather than seeing himself as
an architect of the organization’s culture and the value creation process within it, the
stakeholder equilibration model envisions the manager seeing himself as one stakeholder
among many others, each of whom participates within the stakeholder value creation
process through formal and relational contractual relations. As far as value creation is
concerned, the manager acts to help stakeholders create value for themselves.
Because the stakeholder-equilibration model focuses on value creation within the
spontaneous ordering of stakeholder relationships, there is a tension between it and the
top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model. The top-down model implies a certain
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amount of direct managerial action taken to create stakeholder value. The stakeholderequilibration mode, on the other hand, not only emphasizes indirect ways of creating
stakeholder value but also places limits on what kinds of direct actions should be taken.
As noted above, a spontaneous order functions as “a system of interdependent actions
determined by information and guided by purposes known only to the several acting
persons but not to the directing authority” (Hayek 1973: 51). Because such
interdependence and complexity cannot be fully anticipated and controlled under
conditions of bounded rationality, interference with the spontaneous ordering process can
destroy the fragile balance within the system by distorting and otherwise interfering with
decision-making at the individual level. As a result, those who are tasked with
maintaining the order must be careful to not interfere with it – what they refrain from
doing is just as important as what they do. Specifically, they must refrain from issuing
centralized directives aimed at improving the spontaneous order directly but, instead, act
“only indirectly by enforcing and improving… the formation of a spontaneous order”
(Hayek 1973: 51). Thus, the stakeholder-equilibration model requires that special care
must be taken to not interfere with the established spontaneous order of stakeholder
relations within the firm, even as managers act to create stakeholder value through the
top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model.
Nevertheless, the stakeholder-equilibration model does not imply managerial
inaction nor a diminishment of the managerial role in stakeholder value creation. The
manager plays an important role within such an approach because each stakeholder will
likely pursue her own interests if largely left alone, even at the expense of other
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stakeholders and regardless of power imbalances that may exist between them. If
managers were to simply take a laissez-faire approach to stakeholder interactions, the
business enterprise is likely to suffer – or perhaps even dissolve – due to high political
costs associated with negotiations among various stakeholders with distinct sets of
interests (e.g., Hansmann 1988). Stakeholders who lack leverage may also choose to
leave the business enterprise in favor of other firms rather than engage in negotiations
with stakeholders who have much more leverage. Lastly, firm performance may suffer
because certain stakeholders with leverage may capture all the value that is available
before it can be converted by the firm into future value-creating resources and
opportunities (Coff 1999). As a result, managers must take an active role in supporting
and reinforcing the institutional context within which all stakeholders can further create
value for themselves within the firm.
B) Stakeholder Equilibration and Organizational Norms
Managers can take an active role within the stakeholder-equilibration model by
identifying and refining the organizational norms within the firm. According to Hayek,
the rules around which individual elements within a large-scale society interact to
constitute a spontaneous order are identified and refined primarily by judges who
adjudicate cases in accordance with the common law (1973). Common law refers to
rules that are articulated and refined through a judicial process rather than a legislative
process. For instance, common law jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and the United
States have a set of elaborate rules that have evolved over centuries as generations of
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judges have looked to previous adjudications of similar cases to identify a consistent set
of rules that can be applied to a new pattern of facts. For Hayek, judges who identify the
rules in society according to which individuals act and adjudicate disputes in ways that
articulate and reinforce these rules play a crucial role in maintaining the spontaneous
order within society and thus preserve liberty and increase welfare within it. Judges and
legislators who attempt to create new set of rules through a centralized decision-making
process, on the other hand, risk upsetting the equilibrium that is reached through the
spontaneous ordering process and will likely undermine the welfare and liberty of those
within society.
Just as common law judges identify and refine rules within society to maintain its
spontaneous order, managers can analogously identify and refine relevant rules within the
firm to maintain its spontaneous order. As noted above, spontaneous orders within the
firm emerge out of stakeholder interactions organized around the firm’s culture.
Leveraging the value creation potential of the spontaneous ordering of stakeholder
interactions entails managers strengthening the firm’s culture and making it as
predictable and stable as possible. Although organizational culture can be a nebulous
concept that is difficult to manage or manipulate, an organization’s norms are a
manageable gateway into its culture. Norms are “understood rules for accepted and
expected behavior” (Cialdini et al. 1999: 196). As such, they shape the values and
behavior within an organization to create and reinforce its culture (Cooke and Rousseau
1988; O'Reilly et al. 1991; Ouchi 1980). By identifying norms within the organization
around which stakeholders interact, finding ways to integrate them when they conflict,
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and clarifying them as they are applied to particular facts, managers can act like common
law judges interpreting a tradition of rules that give rise to a spontaneous order.
Managers who act like common law judges look backwards to make decisions in
the present. The managing-for-stakeholders approach argues that managers ought to
adjudicate stakeholder conflicts as best as they can, looking for synergies and searching
for creative solutions that will avoid tradeoffs or, when tradeoffs are unavoidable, making
the tradeoff and then immediately searching for ways to align stakeholder interests once
again (Freeman et al. 2007). Managerial adjudication of stakeholder interests that
proceeds in a similar way as common law adjudication is one in which managers resolve
stakeholder conflicts in accordance with organizational norms that can be identified
through how stakeholder interests have been adjudicated in the past. Just as judges
identify and refine rules through a series of past decisions, managers can look backward
to how the adjudication of similar conflicts between stakeholders within the organization
can point to an organizational norm that can help them with their decision in the present.
And just as common law judging is a highly fact and context specific affair, managers
can focus on the relevant factors for their particular decision at hand to know which
norms are relevant and when norms need to change or evolve.
However, unlike common law judges, managers need not only be backwardlooking. In addition to adjudicating stakeholder conflicts, managers can also act
preemptively by enacting practices and policies that communicate, reinforce, and align
with widely shared organizational norms. One example of how managers can manage an
organization’s norms to reinforce a desirable culture around which stakeholders can
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create value for themselves is Charles O’Reilly’s framework for creating strong cultures
(1989). O’Reilly argues that managers can discern a firm’s values and norms by focusing
on the firm’s incentives systems, the stories that are told by stakeholders, and the values
embodied by leaders among stakeholder groups. After sifting through these norms, he
argues that managers ought to implement a variety of mechanisms for reinforcing
desirable norms such as encouraging stakeholder participation, taking symbolic action to
communicate the firm’s values, encouraging organizational consensus through teambuilding activities, and enacting comprehensive reward systems. By paying attention to
the norms around which stakeholder relationships organize themselves into a spontaneous
order, managers can help stakeholders create as much value as possible for themselves
without allowing the firm to descend into anarchy or instability.
C) Stakeholder Equilibration and Competitive Advantage
The managing-for-stakeholders approach argues that creating value for
stakeholders will also lead to a competitive advantage for the firm for a variety of
reasons. First, creating value for stakeholders is advantageous for the firm because it
increases demand for the firm and its offerings, which allows the firm to command higher
prices and/or higher quality inputs (Harrison et al. 2010; Harrison and Wicks 2013).
Second, it can increase valuable assets within the firm because it leads to improved
stakeholder relationships and other effects of moral capital (e.g., Berman et al. 1999;
Godfrey 2005; Hillman and Keim 2001; Jones 1995). Third, it can reduce costs by
reducing the potential for stakeholder retaliation, e.g., lawsuits, boycotts, strikes, and
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adverse governmental action (Harrison and St. John 1996; Spicer 1978; Steadman et al.
1995). Lastly, it can increase organizational flexibility by making the business enterprise
more sensitive to stakeholder demands, thus allowing it to plan and adapt as stakeholder
demands change over time (Freeman and Evan 1990).
The stakeholder-equilibration model adds to this discussion by outlining a way
that the firm can increase more demand for it and its products, accumulate more assets,
reduce more costs, and increase its flexibility even more. First, because the stakeholderequilibration model allows stakeholders to freely respond to localized circumstances in
accordance with their knowledge of their own utility functions, it will help stakeholders
to identify offerings and opportunities that are better suited for their particular
circumstance and preferences than if their options were limited only to what the
management team presents based on its limited knowledge. The greater level of
personalization and context-specificity will help drive even greater demand for the firm
and its offerings. Second, the ability to create more value for stakeholders will lead to
increased goodwill and other intangible assets associated with a reputation for
stakeholder satisfaction. Not only are spontaneous orders efficient, a focus on
organizational norms can open up more opportunities for stakeholder value creation
because, as research on the common law system and economic development shows,
having strong and predictable rules that govern spontaneous orders tends to increase
value within the order itself (Hayek 1960; 1973; Mahoney 2001). Third, because the
stakeholder-equilibration model seeks to reinforce the firm’s culture, it can lead to a
stronger culture and higher stakeholder commitment (O'Reilly 1989). Combined with an
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active management that encourages internal escalation of conflicts for managerial
adjudication, managerial attempts at strengthening firm culture and increasing
stakeholder commitment will reduce the potential for dissatisfied stakeholders who may
increase costs for the firm. Lastly, the stakeholder-equilibration model can lead to
greater organizational flexibility because it grants more autonomy for stakeholders to
utilize their localized knowledge to adapt to changing circumstances. Spontaneous orders
within the firm are the result of relational contracts through which stakeholders “utilize
their detailed knowledge of their specific situation and… adapt to new information as it
becomes available” (Baker et al. 2002: 40). As a result, leveraging the power of
spontaneous orders rather than through centralized decision-making will allow the firm to
collect, process, and implement knowledge of changing circumstances more efficiently.
Moreover, the stakeholder-equilibration model goes beyond existing insights
within the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model by connecting stakeholder theory
with competitive advantages described by two prominent theories of strategic
management. First, the stakeholder-equilibration model can lead to better strategic fit
within the firm. Strategic fit refers to the degree to which a set of factors match or are
aligned to each other (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Venkatraman and Prescott 1990;
Zajac et al. 2000). Achieving fit between different internal aspects of the firm can be
critical to firm success because it allows the firm to create a unique and valuable strategic
position (Porter 1996). By aligning and refining organizational norms, the stakeholderequilibration model helps to achieve fit between the various norms within the firm.
Moreover, achieving fit between organizational norms can lead to a strategic fit between
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the various stakeholder interactions within the firm since stakeholder relationships are
shaped by organizational norms. And the alignment of stakeholder interactions will help
create a more aligned set of positions that are consistent with greater stakeholder value
creation within the firm. Second, by refraining from directly interfering with the
spontaneous ordering of stakeholder relations within the firm, the stakeholderequilibration model fosters the development of a valuable resource within the firm.
Within the resource-based view of the firm, the strategic position of the firm depends
primarily on its bundle of assets or resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Wernerfelt 1984).
Firms can sustain a competitive advantage when they have resources that are valuable,
rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable (Barney 1991). By encouraging the ongoing development of relational contracts within the firm, the stakeholder-equilibration
model can lead to an accumulation of a thick set of transactional and relational
knowledge developed through relational contracting (Gibbons and Henderson 2012).
This transactional and relational knowledge is valuable and rare because it pertains to
contextual knowledge that is relevant for stakeholder value creation, and it is imperfectly
imitable and non-substitutable because it concerns tacit knowledge that cannot be easily
articulated, let alone transmitted. As a result, the stakeholder-equilibration model can
lead to a sustainable competitive advantage for firms.
V. CONCLUSION
The power of stakeholder theory lies in the convergence of ethical management
and firm success. Taken by itself, the top-down-stakeholder-utility-function model has
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the potential to undermine this power by envisioning the manager only as a central
decision-maker who acts in light of his knowledge of stakeholder utility functions. A
manager who attempts to control the firm in such a way will be putting himself at a
disadvantage because he does not know what stakeholders value and how his actions will
lead to stakeholder value creation. Rather than only controlling stakeholder interactions,
it is better to look also to equilibrating stakeholder interactions and to refrain from
interfering with the organization’s culture and norms. The stakeholder-equilibration
model argues that empowering stakeholders and allowing the firm to be shaped directly
by its stakeholders can be an important component of the managing-for-stakeholders
approach because it leverages the power of spontaneous ordering within the firm. Since a
more democratic organization led by managers who focus on organizational culture is
also a more successful one, managers might benefit from focusing less on controlling and
more on equilibrating.
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